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ABSTRACT
People migrate for a variety of reasons. Some choose to migrate and others are forced. To cross
an international border, they need permission of the host state. The 1951 Refugee Convention
creates the refugee as an exceptional category of international migrants that is entitled to
international protection. This research seeks to explore whether international refugee law
rationally protects vulnerable peoples in the contemporary world. This is done through
examining the historical context through which the refugee was created as a legal subject in
international law and evaluating the critiques of the current implementation of international
refugee law. This thesis argues that the causes of migration from countries of the global south are
linked with global inequalities of power and wealth, a condition that the human rights and
humanitarian language of the international refugee regime fails to address.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper begins with the idea that international refugee law is unhelpful in addressing
displacement and migration in contemporary society. International refugee law developed as a
reaction to massive displacement at the onset of the twentieth century, as empires were
dissolving and new ideological regimes were developing, and when nations were forming and
borders were being drawn. The laws and norms that developed in this period were effective for
most of the twentieth century, but they only addressed the issue of displacement of Europe.
Currently refugees and asylum seekers represent only 10.5 million 1 of approximately 214
million international migrants. 2 Migration occurs as a result of various reasons including socioeconomic conditions (poverty, unemployment, etc.), development projects, environmental
disasters and degradation, generalized violence, and conflict, among others. Although there are a
variety of reasons that compel a person to migrate, either voluntarily or by force, since 1951 the
refugee has been categorized as an exceptional group of international migrants that is entitled to
international protection. This exceptional group of international migrants are persons who are
outside their country and,
…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country. 3

This definition is found in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and reflects
the perceptions of its time with regard to political priorities and causes of forced migration.
Although sixty years have passed and the geopolitics and nature of forced migration have
changed significantly, the above definition is still largely used to determine which migrants fall
into the exceptional category of refugeehood, and thus deserving of international protection.

1

This includes 597,300 persons UNHCR considers to be in ‘refugee-like’ situations, and does not include
the some 4.8 million Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of the United Nations Works and Relief
Agency. See UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, 10th ed. (UN
High Commissioner for Refugees, December 27, 2011), 6, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f06ecf72.html
(accessed March 2, 2012).
2
International Organization for Migration, “Global Estimate and Trends,” IOM,
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en (accessed January, 4 2012).
3
UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations Treaty Series,
189 (July 29, 1951): 137,http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html (accessed December 20, 2011).
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Unlike the refugees of the past, today’s refugee are no longer white, European, or ideologically
significant. 4 In fact the vast majority of refugees and asylum-seekers, are produced from some of
the poorest countries in the world, from what will be referred to as the global south. 5
This paper will utilize dichotomies as a tool to draw on the differential treatment of
refugees and other migrants, specifically through the use of the terms ‘global north’ and ‘global
south.’ Such terms can be problematic as they create ridged geographic distinctions and imply
that regions or peoples are homogeneous. In contemporary discourse, the dichotomies of global
north and south have generally replaced the earlier terminology of West and East, or First and
Third Worlds, but contemporary terminology carries with it the same problems. The global
south refers to certain parts of the world that have been left behind in terms socio-economic
development and success 6 and connotes images of “squalor, corruption, violence, calamities and
disasters,

irrational

local

fundamentalisms,

bad

smell,

garbage,

filth,

technological

'backwardness' or simply lack of modernity.” 7 The danger in using these dichotomies is that they
create broad generalizations which fail to reflect the diversity of persons, societies and cultures
in both the global north and south, as well as the economic prosperity of some people in the
south and the impoverishment of some in the north. 8 What many states in the south do share is a
common history and experience of colonialism and oppression by the north, which has shaped
their political consciousness as well as placed them in a certain narrative that has been created
and perpetuated by the north. 9 The danger in using these distinctions is that it further validates
them and entrenches these false generalizations. While aware of this issue, dichotomies can also
be a useful and strategic tool for challenging and re-shaping current understandings. For this
thesis, the use of the global north and south can be useful because the 1951 Convention was
created in a time when such dichotomies, as well as the East-West Cold War dichotomy, were
influential in law making. As Steinbeck notes, the 1951 Convention is “both a product and a part
4

B.S. Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South,” Journal of Refugee Studies
11, no. 4 (1998): 351.
5
See UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010.
6
Usha Natarajan, “The 2003 Iraq Invasion and the Nature of International Law” (PhD diss., Australian
National University, 2008), 57-58.
7
BalakrishnanRajagopal, “Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography,” Third World Legal Studies
15, no.1 (1998-99):2.
8
In terms of GDP, global south countries such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and Korea are listed among the top
twenty countries. See The World Bank, “GDP Ranking 2010,” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/GDP-ranking-table(accessed May 1, 2012).
9
Natarajan, “The 2003 IraqInvasion and the Nature of International Law,” 57-58.

2

of history of the twentieth century.” 10 Utilizing this dichotomy as a literary tool is important for
this thesis as it enables addressing the divided understanding of the world in which these laws
were created, and the divide that has been perpetuated through their use.
Moving into the twenty first century, international refugee law has been challenged on all
fronts. For some governments, international refugee law prevents them from controlling (and
restricting) entry into their countries. As Dauvergne argues, “in the present era of globalization,
control over the movement of people has become the last bastion of sovereignty;” 11 the desire to
maintain control over who can and cannot enter the territory of the state has been met with
restrictive border polices, often times at the detriment of refugee protection. On the other hand,
many refugee organizations and advocates believe that the definition of a refugee, as someone
entitled to international legal protection, is far too narrow to fit with the contemporary realities of
migration and those in need of international protection.
This paper will argue that international refugee law was formulated in a specific
historical moment and time that is no longer relevant to the causes of migration and the changing
demographic of the persons in need of protection, effectively making the current legal subject of
the refugee an irrational exception in the larger context of migration. In utilizing this outdated
and problematic distinction, the refugee regime 12 has created a system which utilizes the
discourse of human rights and humanitarianism to exacerbate and further widen to socioeconomic divide between the global north and south, maintaining, and even strengthening, the
current international power dynamic, as well as compromising the real value of the protection
that is currently offered.
As Legoux notes, “what tends to render the asylum law…ineffectual for the people of
poor countries is the result of a particular conception of asylum, one with a long and complex
history, and one which is becoming ever more stringent.” 13 Utilizing this idea, Part I will trace
the historical roots of international refugee law and its evolution into the current refugee regime,

10

Daniel J.Steinbock, “The Refugee Definition as Law: Issues of Interpretation,” in RefugeeRights and
Realities, ed. Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (WestNyack, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19.
11
Catherine Dauvergne, “Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times,” The Modern Law Review 67,
no. 4 (July 2004): 1.
12
The ‘refugee regime’ will be used to refer to the international, regional and domestic refugee laws and
policies, UNHCR, and the various international and domestic assistance and aid refugee organizations.
13
Luc Legoux, quoted in Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London: Taylor &
Francis. 2005): 13. Originally this quote was specific to asylum procedures in France, however I believe that the
main point of the statement is true for asylum procedures in the global north.
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with attention to how the definition of a refugee was created, and a specific focus on who it was
created for. Beginning in the formation of sovereign states and the ideals associated with
sovereignty, the protections and rights that refugee law articulates are contextualized in a certain
type of legal framework and individual-state relationship. Moving through the formation of the
refugee definition and protection in World War I and II, and ending with the Cold War, one can
see the way the definition was shaped by a certain kind of European displacement, as well as the
political agenda of the time period. Through this progression it is evident that the legal subject of
the ‘refugee’ was created in international law under exceptional circumstances of global war, and
certain conditions of displacement.
Since the 1951 Convention was created, there has been an outflow of criticism and
suggested reforms. Part II of the paper will discuss the major critiques and recommended
reforms of international refugee law and the protection regime. Much of the current critique
focuses on the restrictive measures and procedures for asylum in the global north, which is
important to understanding the global north’s desire to limit the entry of asylum-seekers (and
more generally, international migrants) from the global south. This in turn sheds light on the
problematic role the wealthier countries in the global north play in regulating (and largely
controlling) global refugee protection.
Finally, Part III will engage with the reality of migration in the global south, which often
falls outside of the purview of international refugee law. The global geopolitical shift since the
end of the Cold War and the process of globalization has challenged international refugee law.
The causes of migration – whether forced or voluntary – are becoming increasingly related to the
state of global inequality, making the current legal category of the ‘refugee’ largely irrelevant.
As this reality has emerged, this section will also discuss the global north’s preference for
regional refugee protection systems and the way in which the issue of refugees has been depoliticized and relegated almost entirely to the realm of humanitarianism. The paper will
conclude with what can be done to understand the contemporary realities of forced migration and
move forward to a more realistic and relevant framework for protection.
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PART I: THE CREATION OF THE REFUGEE
Displacement is not a modern problem. Throughout history persons have moved (by
force or by choice) due to war, famine, and other causes. However, human migration and
movement has only become “categorized, politicized, qualified, quantified, studied and
controlled with the growth of the contemporary nation-state.”14 The contemporary legal category
of the refugee, and the regime that is charged with their protection, has been constructed
predominately during the twentieth century, and especially influential has been the political and
security agenda of the modern nation state.
Arguments have been made that refugee production today is rooted in the geo-political
structure of the world, which is based on the idea of state sovereignty. 15 International refugee
law and, more broadly, international law, have evolved with the modern state system reflecting
changes and concerns in economics, ideologies, and balance of power. 16 In order to understand
where international refugee law stands today, it is important not only to understand the history
and development of refugee law and the refugee regime, but also the system of governance and
political ideologies that it exists within a system built upon the foundational concept of state
sovereignty.
The Rise of Sovereignty and Sovereign Borders
The notion of state sovereignty, as an international legal concept (and arguably the ‘ideal’
form of governance) was cemented in the Peace of Westphalia, which was signed in 1648. 17
Among other things, 18 this treaty brought forth a new form of governance in Europe based on a
sovereign state. This system established a model in which all sovereign states were all
14

Alison Mountz, “Migration,” in Key Concepts in Political Geography, Carolyn Gallaher, et al.,
(London: SAGE Publications, 2009), 174.
15
Charles B. Keely, “The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters,”
International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 303-14.
16
Laure Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,”
International Journal of Refugee Law 14, no. 2 (2002): 239.
17
The Peace of Westphalia marked the official end of the Thirty-Years War, which took place from 16181648. For more information, see Thomas H. Greer and Gavin Lewis, A Brief History of the Western World, 9th ed.
(Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 398-400.
18
The Peace of Westphalia also established a principle of tolerance by instating equality between Protestant
and Catholic states and providing some safeguards for religious minorities, as well as mechanisms for conflict
resolution between European powers. See Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” The American
Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (January 1948): 20-41; and Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the
Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 310.
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theoretically equal in terms of international law and diplomacy. 19 Although states in Europe were
not equal in population, territorial size, or military power, they were all entitled to the ‘right to
sovereignty.’ 20 Westphalia was intended to signify the end of imperialism in some senses, 21 and
the “abandonment of a hierarchal structure of society and [the] option for a new system
characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory.” 22
It created a unified European political system and also led to the creation of international law. 23
The conventional idea of a state’s sovereignty is narrowly conceived as “the power of a
State to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory,” or “territorial
supremacy.” 24 In order for this territory to gain meaning, there must be borders that separate
sovereign powers or states from each other and within these borders there must be persons who
hold a sort of membership to the nation, or citizenship. Borders, as lines and limits of
sovereignty, also largely decide citizenship. States are bound by rules of membership, in which
citizens belong and all others are aliens. 25 In the legal sense, citizenship is a “formalized
categorical designation,” 26 which, in theory, creates a sort of social contract in which states are
legally responsible for the citizens of their sovereign state.27 Within this relationship of rights
and obligations is implied a territorial component, in which all states care for their own citizens
within the borders of the country.
This model of the sovereign state, complete with territorial borders and notions of
nationality or citizenship, gained its reinforcement as the norm and was the dominant model of
political organization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The dissolution of empires after
World War I, the realignment of powers after World War II, the process of decolonization, and
the break-up of the Soviet Union, all brought about new sovereign states formed in the
19

Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia.”
Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia,” 29.
21
This of course does not refer to colonialism, which was seen as a project of modernization, as well as an
extension of the sovereign. For a critical analysis of how the ‘civilizing mission’ of the project of colonialism
interacts with this idea of extending the sovereign, see Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law.
22
Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia,” 28.
23
Ibid., 29.
24
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1, Peace (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1905), 170.
25
Charles B. Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” International Migration
Review 30, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 1051.
26
Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means For Migration and Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 121.
27
Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, “Migration Without Borders: An Investigation Into the Free
Movement of People,” Global Migration Perspectives no. 27, UNESCO, (April 2005): 8-9.
20
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Westphalian Model, where borders marked the territory and the limits of these new or reformed
sovereigns. Arguably, the “assumption that countries ought to be organized as nation-states is the
key to understanding the political basis of refugee production and of policies towards refugees
developed in the twentieth century.” 28 Refugee protection is a surrogate protection provided by a
sovereign state to a non-national when their own state fails to protect them. Thus, in the legal
sense, without borders and sovereign states there can be no refugees.
The international response to refugee flows that developed from the events of World
Wars I and II were founded on the sovereign state system. 29 Uncontrolled movements of persons
who would normally be under the protection of their state threaten political stability, and “if the
movement is caused by people who lack their state's normal protection, then a serious failure of
the state system has occurred.” 30 Understanding how the perceived failures of the First and
Second World Wars led to the creation of international refugee law, and arguably created the
refugee through defining it, helps explain the political motivations and limitations of the law as it
operates today.
International refugee law, as is exists today, entered the international system as
international law, through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Although the
notion of a refugee, or rather people fleeing conflict or living in exile has existed throughout
history, 31 as an international mechanism for protection, international refugee law is relatively
new and was created during a specific moment in history. International Refugee Law represents
developments from the period of 1921-1951 as a response to assist those displaced from the
events of World Wars I and II.
The First and Second World Wars
Prior to 1920, world powers were unconcerned with creating a universal refugee
definition. Before World War I, European empires still governed vast parts of the world, borders
were fewer, and large numbers of Europeans could move to the Americas and other lands
‘discovered’ by Europe in Australia and New Zealand. However this changed when massive
28

Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” 1046.
Ibid., 1051.
30
Ibid.
31
For information on the historic, pre-World Wars I and II treatment of asylum, see Barnett, “Global
Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 239-41 and S. Prakash Sinha, Asylum and
International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 5-49.
29
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groups of forced migrants began to exist starting with World War I.32 As a result of World War I,
new states were created that excluded many ethnic minorities from citizenship based on
languages, ethnicity, location, or religious affiliation. 33 The creation of sovereign states allows
governments to delimit their citizenry, which they did by defining “broad categories of people as
belonging to the nation-state and relegated others to the ranks of outsiders and aliens who
threatened national and cultural cohesion.” 34 Here we can see how the creation of a sovereign
state, as well as the power to define members of the state, can actually produce refugee flows
deeming some citizens without a nationality, or stateless. 35
Russian Displacement
Refugee law and the refugee regime have its roots in actions that were taken in the early
twentieth century at the behest of the League of Nations. 36 The first major movement of this
century that was recognized as needing protection were those who were displaced as a result of
the Russian Revolution in 1917, as more than one million persons fled the Bolshevik Regime
between 1917 and 1921. 37 The first organized efforts for refugee protection took place in 1921,
when the League of Nations at the request of the International Committee for the Red Cross,
established a High Commissioner for Refugees, Fredtjof Nansen, who was primarily charged
with dealing with the issues of forcibly displaced Russians. 38
32

James C. Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950,” The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 30, no. 2 (April 1984): 348.
33
Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 34.
34
Ibid., 35.
35
For example, after World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the territory of the Kurdish
people, referred to as Kurdistan, was divided between neighboring territories as they formed sovereign states,
including Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the former Soviet Union. Due to their ethnic affiliation as Kurds, which
includes a distinct language and cultural traditions, many Kurds became stateless, which has yet to be resolved. For
more information on the issue of Kurdish statelessness and refugee status see Matthew J. Gibney and Randall
Hansen. Eds., Immigration and Asylum: From 1900 to the Present, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005),
368-373. Another example is the creation of states in Africa based on the colonial borders, which did not accurately
represent the traditional borders of African peoples. As states were created conflicts erupted and many people were
excluded from state protection, and many conflicts have arisen over issues of resource distribution and power
between ethnic groups. Many governments in the region have also become unstable to the point of being considered
a “failed state,” such as Somalia and Liberia, which have in turn produced mass amounts of refugees. For more
information on the issues of how the state contributes to refugee production in Africa see Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi,
“The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the Institutions of the State,” International Journal of Refugee Law 6,
no. 4 (1994): 562-80.
36
Keely, “The International Refugee Regime(s),” 304.
37
Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 241.
38
Ibid., 242; Loescher, Beyond Charity, 36.
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The creation of this Commissioner was the first time that the issue of refugees was
recognized in international law. This Refugee Commissioner was given a temporary mandate
with a limited focus on displaced persons from Russia, so there was no creation of a general
definition for who was a refugee, but rather a category-oriented approach through which
displaced persons were identified based on group affiliation and origin. 39 Russians were
identified as a specific group of people that required protection based on certain political
circumstances. 40 The task of this Commissioner was to organize repatriation, to allocate some
refugees to resettlement countries, and provide general relief. 41
However, this limited mandate was problematic, as many other groups were also facing
severe problems. As issues for displaced Armenians escalated, protection was extended
specifically to this group in conjunction with the efforts made for Russians. 42 In 1926, the
League of Nations issued an arrangement that dealt with the issuance of identity documents for
Russian and Armenian refugees and, rather than creating a generals definition, the groups
eligible for these certificates were simply referred to as ‘Russian refuges’ and ‘Armenian
refugees’, with simple, straightforward definitions:
Russian refugee: Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy the protection of the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who has not acquired any
other nationality.
Armenian refugee: Any person of Armenian origin, formerly a subject of the Ottoman
Empire, who does not enjoy the protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic
and who has not acquired any other nationality. 43

Although a definition of refugee is put forth, it is based on geographical origin rather than a
general definition that can be applied to any person fleeing from any country.

39

Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 242.
Ibid..
41
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 241-43.
42
The Armenians were established originally in what is now north-east Turkey, and “since the late
nineteenth century, [the Armenians] had been systematically persecuted and massacred by the Turkish Government
as a result of its distinctive religion and culture. In February 1915, Turkey commenced a series of mass deportations
and indiscriminate killings of Armenians. While the subsequent Allied occupation afforded a degree of protection to
the Armenians, the massacres began again in October 1921 following the withdrawal of French troops. A mass
exodus of Armenians to Greece, Bulgaria, Constantinople, Syria and Russia ensued during 1921 and 1922.” See
Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 352-354.
43
Report by the High Commissioner, League of Nations Doc. 1926.XLII.2 (1926): 5, quoted in Hathaway,
“The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 353.
40
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By the end of 1926 it was clear that Russians and Armenians were not the only persons in
need of protection, so the League of Nations voted to extend protection to “other categories of
refugees who, as a consequence of the war, are living under analogous conditions [to those of the
Russian and Armenian refugees].” 44 After much debate and discussion over who should have
protection, 45 as well as what can ‘reasonably expected’ of the League, the final definition that
was reached extended protection to Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldeaen, and Turkish refugees. 46 The
definitions for these groups is similar to the above definitions for the Russian and Armenian
refugees, in which it delimits refugees as originating from specific territories and/or events.47
These definitions did outline some general characteristics, on which refugee status was based,
namely the “lack of protection and effective non-nationality.” 48 That this extension of protection
was given to only a fraction of those identified as in need of protection by the High
Commissioner indicates the highly selective nature of the expanded definition. It also created a
protection gap, which results when “refugee definitions become divorced from events—the
social and political reality— which actually produces refugees.” 49 Although refugee protection
was granted to Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldaeans, and Turks, the other groups
that Nansen identified as in need of protection in his original proposal still went on with no
official international mechanism or international responsibility for protection. 50
In 1933, refugee protection for the groups mentioned in the 1926 and 1928 League of
Nations arrangements (but primarily focused on Russian and Armenians) became regularized in
the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees. 51 In outlining the protection that
44

League of Nations O.J. 155, 8, no. 2 (1927), quoted in Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in
International Law,” 354.
45
The initial proposition from Nansen included providing protection to some 155,000 persons that fell into
seven categories, including 150 Assyrians, 19,000 Assyro-Chaldaeans, Ruthenians, a number of Montenegrins,
16,000 Jews, 150 Turks, and some 110,000 persons who were dispersed throughout Central Europe, predominately
former Hungarians, however the League believed that this was too much, and it was reduced to the above extension
in the text. See Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 354-355.
46
Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 355.
47
For full definition, see Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 356-357.
48
Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 242.
49
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 17.
50
The groups listed in Nansen’s original proposal were also chosen selectively based on whether or not
their conditions were analogous to that of the displaced Russian and Armenians who were already under
international protection. So in effect even Nansen’s rejected proposal for protection was based on limited criteria of
those who fit into the general mold of conditions of displacement already configured by the League of Nations.
Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law,” 354-357.
51
See League of Nations, “Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees,” League of Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. CLIX, No. 3663, (League of Nations, October 28, 1933),
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was given to the defined parties mentioned above, this Convention was created also as an attempt
to limit repatriation back to their home countries as well as provide some rights for the refugees
while living in the country of asylum. These rights included education, employment, and the
right to receive travel documents. 52 With this Convention came the regularization of identity
documents called Nansen Passports,53 recognized by most governments as valid. However, not
all states were obligated to receive refugees that held these documents. 54 Here we see that states
acknowledged that refugee protection was necessary and important. However, despite such
recognition, many states were not willing to receive refugees and offer protection themselves,
which is something that continues to plague the refugee protection system and will be addressed
in Part II.
Forced Displacement from Germany
As the Nazi Party rose to power in Germany, an important population movement began
as thousands of Jewish persons fled, who were in need of protection. In 1933, the Office for the
High Commissioner of Refugees coming from Germany was established in order to coordinate
relief efforts. However it was not until 1936 that efforts began to expand legitimate protection to
refugees fleeing Germany. 55 When the Commissioner was established in Germany, the League
of Nations instructed the Commissioner to “avoid discussing causes or stressing the political
dimension of the refugee problem,” so as to not antagonize Germany who was still a member of
the League of Nations at the time. 56 Essentially, the Commission was restricted to providing
relief, and not confronting the causes of movement. As the scale of the Jewish displacement
problem continued to grow, states were reluctant to extend protection to them for reasons of
finance, as the Great Depression was still affecting many countries, as well as the fear that this
international obligation to protect would impede the nation’s sovereign right to deport noncitizens. 57 In 1936, James G. McDonald, the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from
52
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Germany, quit his post stating the limitations of the current international response in his
resignation letter, indicating that:
The efforts of the private organizations and of any League [of Nations] organization for refugees
can only mitigate a problem of growing gravity and complexity. In the present economic
conditions of the world, the European States, and even those overseas, have only a limited power
of absorption of refugees. The problem must be tackled at its source if disaster is to be avoided. 58

For McDonald, assistance only met part of the problem, but did not confront the causes
that created the situation of displacement. Additionally, in his letter, McDonald drew attention to
the human rights abuses that were the cause of refugee movement from Germany, calling for
states to set aside their concerns of state sovereignty in order meet humanitarian necessities,
stating that “when domestic politics threaten the demoralization and exile of hundreds of
thousands of human beings, considerations of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of
common humanity.” 59 However, calling for countries to meet humanitarian needs failed to spark
an international intervention. 60 Without a broader definition and established international
obligations, the situation in Germany evidenced that countries will likely not provide support if
political or economic interests dictate otherwise. In this case, the unavailability of other countries
to take in refugees and to assist monetarily in the Commission’s effort resulted in a lack of
effective protection for displaced Jews.
In 1936, it was decided that steps should be taken to meet the needs of the displaced
persons coming from Germany. In the process of planning the Conference for Provisional
Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany in 1936, although the
official Convention would not be signed until 1938, the High Commissioner prepared a
Convention draft, defining the German refugee as:
any person having left German territory who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of
the Government of the Reich and who does not possess any nationality other than German
nationality. 61

The definition that was adopted in the 1936 Conference (mentioned above) was then
incorporated into the 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from
Germany, 62 which was slightly different, defining the German refugee as:
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a) Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not possessing any other
nationality who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the German
Government.
(b) Stateless persons not covered by previous Conventions or Agreements who have left Germany
territory after being established therein and who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the
protection of the Germany Government.

This definition differs from the initial proposal in that it extends protection to stateless
persons who were either living in Germany or outside of Germany, offering a liberalized version
of the proposed refugee policy, in that it broadens the scope of who can be covered. However,
like German nationals, it suggests the stateless persons must prove that they do not enjoy
protection of the German regime. 63 There is also the addition of Article 1(2) of the 1938
Convention, which excludes some from protection, stating “Persons who leave Germany for
reasons of purely personal convenience are not included in this definition.” 64 The minutes of the
meeting for the draft process of this Convention indicate that the persons in mind for the
exclusion clause were those who "persons who had left Germany for economic reasons but
without being compelled to do so, or [who] had gone abroad in order to evade taxation". 65 This
article indicates that there must be evidence of persecution based on specific types of violence,
not generalized violence or wartime conditions. Whereas in the past a category-oriented
approach was utilized, this definition was comparatively strict, 66 making refugee status more
difficult to obtain.
It is interesting to note that the United States took little notice of the refugee problem
coming from Germany, failed to increase their immigration quotas to account for the increasing
need for persons to be resettled, and failed to sign any of the drafted Conventions. 67 However, in
July 1938, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a meeting in Evian in France, to discuss
62
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the increasing issue of resettling refugees coming from Germany and Austria. 68 This meeting
failed as it achieved little in terms of actual change in resettlement policies, but rather
“reaffirmed the extreme reluctance of the United States and the rest of the world to offer a
lifeline to Jewish refugees.” 69 From this meeting, one can see how the financial burden of
refugees and asylum seekers entered discourse, as Germany was not allowing Jews to leave with
their assets and many countries were concerned with the economic cost of taking in resettled
refugees as unemployment was high in many countries and finances were unstable as a result of
the Great Depression. 70
The Interwar Organizations
However, the Evian conference did result in the creation of another new refugee
mechanism, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), which operated outside the
sphere of the League of Nations and was tasked with negotiating with Germany about Jewish
migration, 71 in order to facilitate involuntary migration for
1) persons who have not already left their country of origin (Germany, including Austria), but
who must emigrate on account of their political opinions, religious beliefs or racial origin,
and (2) persons as defined in (1) who have already left their country of origin and who have
not yet established themselves permanently elsewhere 72

Here, protection was extended to potential refugees who have not/or were unable to leave the
country, qualifying them as refugees in need of protection. 73 However, this definition also
limited assistance to those that were fleeing on account of political opinion, religious beliefs, or
issues of racial origin. It based decision-making on individual consideration of the merits of
claims, rather than assumption of de jure or de facto lack of protection for certain categories. 74
The IGCR attempted to work with Germany to “achieve an orderly exodus of Jews, who would
be allowed to take their property and possessions with them,” 75 yet in actuality the Germans did
not let Jews leave without sacrificing most of their possessions. With the states in West unwilling
68
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to finance a resettlement program, the exit from Germany and entrance to Western countries was
effectively closed. 76 Essentially, the mass murder of Jews that happened at this time was “tacitly
tolerated” by much of the Western world until it was too late: 77 “Jews were victim of
international complacency and diplomatic priorities”. 78
After World War II, the League of Nations had dissolved, as had its High Commissioner
for Refugees. To continue the Commissioner’s efforts, the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created by Allied powers in November 1943. 79 The
UNRRA was primarily concerned with providing assistance to “civilian nationals of the allied
nations and to displaced persons in liberated countries, and with the repatriation and return of
prisoners of war”, and was not authorized to resettle displaced persons or find ‘solutions’ for
refugees who were unable to return home. 80 Initially, those persons that were unable to return
home were referred to the IGCR for assistance. However, in August 1945, the UNRRA
Resolution 71 created the expansion of the UNRRA focus to include refugee protection, with the
statement that aid may be extended to "other persons who have been obliged to leave their
country or place of origin or former residence." 81 Over the next year there was debate over how
to define the persons to whom this protection should be extended to, primarily between the
Washington and London offices of the UNRRA. There was also criticism from the Eastern Bloc,
who resented UNRRA efforts that facilitated the emigration of their nationals. 82 This definition
was not based on subjective determinants, so the definition meant that “only persons suffering
from objectively demonstrable incompatibility with their State of origin could receive the
benefits of refugee status.”83
Although the UNRRA and IGCR were both working to provide assistance to some forced
migrants in Europe, three years after the end of the war there were still over three million
displaced Europeans who had yet to find a solution to their problem. Thus, another organization
76
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was created to take over the task of finding a solution to the situation in Europe, the International
Refugee Organization (IRO). The UNRRA was primarily funded by the US, which contributed
approximately 70 per cent of the UNRRA funds. However, the US was very critical of the
UNRRA operations, particularly their repatriation and rehabilitation efforts in the Eastern Bloc. 84
In order to remedy their concerns, the US pulled their funding from UNRRA, effectively ending
the organization, and worked to create the IRO in December 1946. 85 The US believed that the
UNRRA was potentially empowering and consolidating the Eastern Soviet powers by sending
back persons and providing aid through rehabilitation programs. Thus, to rectify this, the primary
function of the IRO was to be for resettlement of displaced persons, not repatriation. 86
Prior to the creation of the IRO, refugee organizations had dealt with specific groups of
refugees. However, the IRO mandate was the first time that a more general definition was put
forward for ‘refugee’. 87 The IRO was the first time that refugee status was based on individual
rather than group determination, as well as the acceptance of the individual’s right to flee from
persecution. 88 The IRO utilized an individual determination procedure for persons who were
victims of the Nazi government or similar regimes, as well as victims of persecution for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and refugees of long standing, 89 who “in complete
freedom and after receiving full knowledge of the facts…expressed valid objections to returning
to [their countries of origin].” 90 A ‘valid objection’ could be a demonstration that the person
feared persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality or political opinion; if the individual
raised political objections, the IRO would then judge the validity of the objection. 91 Persons who
were involved with movements hostile to any of the United Nations’ member states were
excluded from this protection, as well as “[r]efugees returning to their country of origin,
acquiring a new nationality, becoming firmly established, unreasonably refusing to accept IRO
repatriation or resettlement proposals, failing to make a substantial effort towards earning a
living when able to do so, or otherwise exploiting the IRO ceased to be of concern to the
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[IRO].”92
Although the IRO was utilizing a more general definition of a refugee, the
organization was targeting those displaced by World War II, as well as some of the new Cold
War refugees. The definition was the most comprehensive and functional definition when
compared with other refugee organizations at the time. Thus, by mid-1947, the IRO took over the
operations of the UNRRA, the IGCR, and the former activities of the League of Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. 93
The 1951 Convention and the creation of the UNHCR
When the war came to an end in 1945, it left some 30 million people uprooted and
displaced, ‘soldiers and displaced people who did not want or could not return home because of
border changes, including more than 12 million ethnic Germans who were expelled from the
Soviet Union.’ 94 The IRO was able to resettle over one million refugees between 1947 and 1951
(primarily in the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel, and other Western European
countries). 95 The IRO was meant to complete its activities in June 1950, however when this time
approached it was clear that the ‘problem’ of refugees was not solved, especially with the new
refugees arriving from East and Central Europe; 96 in its final report to the United Nations
General Assembly, they cautioned that the temporary problem they were tasked with targeting
was quickly becoming a permanent issue. 97
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created during the
height of these tensions on 1 January, 1951, taking over where the IRO left off. 98 UNHCR was
created to ‘“provide international protection’ and ‘permanent solutions for the problem of
refugees’”. Its activities were to be “of an entirely non-political character—it is to be
‘humanitarian’ and ‘social’ and to relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees.” 99 In
July 1951, drawing on their experiences of international efforts to assist refugees, reaching back
92
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to 1920, the United Nations created the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 100
which was to be supervised by UNHCR, further regularizing refugees and setting out several
rights that refugees are entitled to. The 1951 Convention does not explicitly grant the right to
obtain asylum, as its purpose is to define the scope of the right to seek and enjoy asylum which is
found in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 101 The 1951 Convention, in
the series of treaties pertaining to displaced persons, was more comprehensive than previous
Conventions and arrangements. This Convention outlines the refugees’ right to remain in the
country of asylum, the right to return to their home country, the principle of non-refoulement, as
well as minimum standards for treatment by the host country, an outline for determination
procedures, and eligibility criteria for asylum. 102 Although it is out of the scope of this paper to
discuss every aspect of the 1951 Convention in detail, a brief overview of refugee rights and
state obligations, and special attention to how a refugee is defined is pertinent to the present
discussion.
The most contentious portion of the 1951 Convention is arguably article 1, which defines who
can and cannot become a refugee. According to this article, a refugee is someone who is outside
their country of residence and,
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 103

Due to a disagreement between the drafters of the Convention, governments were also given the
option of limiting refugee protection to those coming from Europe, or had the option to open it to
those coming from “Europe and elsewhere.” 104 Following the IRO, this definition was
“individual-oriented and emphasized the causes of flight rather than relying on the more
categorical approach that focused on the origin of specific groups”, which most groups prior to
100

Hereafter referred to as the 1951 Convention
Article 14 states: (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political
crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. UN General Assembly,
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” (December, 10 1948),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html (accessed February 11, 2012).
102
Barnett, “Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee Regime,” 247.
103
UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” Article 1.
104
Loescher, Beyond Charity, 57.
101

18

the IRO utilized. 105 Looking at the previous sections, one can see that the definition has its roots
in the conditions used by IRO. These five categories/grounds of persecution (race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, and political opinion) that were included in
the 1951 Convention definition have ties to the period during and in between World War I and II,
in which most persons were persecuted for these reasons. 106 Additionally, the emphasis on
persons being ‘outside the country of his former habitual residence’ “emphasizes the territorial
nature of the refugee regimes, reinforcing respect for sovereignty, and the inability of an
international organization to look within a nation’s borders.” 107 This notion will be discussed
further in Part II.
The restrictions in the definition were likely done, first and foremost, because, as
previously stated, the definition was created with a particular group of persons in mind, but also
to restrict the numbers of persons who qualified for protection as well as to identify those
individuals, within the larger context of forced displacement, who required special international
legal protection. 108
Those asylum-seekers that are found to fit into the definition listed in Article 1 of the
1951 Convention are entitled to certain rights while in the country of asylum, including, but not
limited to, the right to access courts 109the right to gainful employment, 110 the right to housing,111
and the right to public education, 112 as well as the right to move freely within the territory of the
state 113 and obtain identity papers and/or travel documents. 114 Many of these rights were in
addition to the rights granted under the aforementioned Conventions dealing with displaced
persons.
States are able to make reservations to parts of the Convention (i.e. access to public
services or to employment). However they cannot make reservations to the definition, as well as
the principle of non-refoulement, 115 in which no state “shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee
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in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened.” 116 To ensure this, Article 31 stipulates that “Contracting States shall not impose
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence on refugees who, coming directly from a
territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1,” 117 as obtaining the
required legal documents may not be possible in their country of origin.
In addition to granting the above rights to refugees, signatory states also have the
responsibility to cooperate with UNHCR in its functions and applying the convention, including
providing reports on the condition of refugees, the implementation of the Convention, and on
national legislation or decrees that enter into force regarding refugees. 118 Unlike previous
treaties, the 1951 Convention was more detailed and broad, as it did not take a nationalityspecific approach to providing asylum, however it was also more restrictive in that the asylumseeker must ‘prove’ their need for protection based on certain criteria.
UNHCR, the organization charged with implementing and overseeing the 1951
Convention, was initially provided with a three year mandate, with a small budget and restricted
fundraising capacity 119; this also accounts for the temporal limitation of the Convention, as it
was likely assumed that when the mandate of UNHCR ended, the convention would cease to be
necessary. However, as the Cold War continued to produce refugees, UNHCR quickly moved
away from post-War reconstruction into involvement in the Cold War. 120 The first crisis that
UNHCR dealt with was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 121 and in the following years, persons
from many countries in the Eastern Bloc.
The political scene in the 1950s was very polarized, between the East and the West,
between communism and capitalism, and arguably the refugee definition centered on this
ideological opposition. 122 With Communist refugees, resettlement was less of an issue, as
communist refugees were ideologically significant to Western policymakers, specifically in the
United States, and in fact Western governments encouraged refugee movement from the Eastern
Bloc, “in order to weaken their rivals ideologically and to gain political legitimacy in their Cold
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War struggle.” 123 The United States government became very involved in refugee resettlement
and aid, even setting up the United States Escapee Program to facilitate defections from the
Soviet countries. 124
With some states taking control of much of the refugee protection and resettlement
during the Cold War, the implications of which will be discussed in Part II and III, UNHCR was
free to become involved in other refugee movements. 125 During the Cold War, two refugee
regimes emerged: the first was among the industrialized countries of the First World 126 accepting
refugees from Communist states; and the second was for forcible displacement in the rest of the
world, namely the Third World. 127 As discussed previously, refugees coming from the Soviet
countries during the Cold War were a political tool for the anti-communist regimes of Western
Europe and North America, particularly the United States. During the Cold War, persons fleeing
were effectively “voting with their feet,”128 and added to the ideological battle that was ensuing
between the West and East. The logic of this regime was to utilize refugee movement to
destabilize governments and cause states to fail, reflected in the domestic policies that
encouraged refugees to flee the Eastern Bloc. 129 Throughout the Cold War, these two regimes
existed side by side, as the one regime instigated Eastern instability and insecurity, while the
other regime was a protection and containment mechanism for civil wars and proxy wars
happening in the Third World. 130 During this time, UNHCR became an organization that focused
much of its work in the Third World. 131
Through the 1960s and 1970s, UNHCR’s attention was on territories in Africa and Asia
that were experiencing many civil wars as they went through the process of decolonization,
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perhaps evidencing the failure of the Westphalian state outside of the First World. 132 Some of
these wars were independent from the Cold War, while others were proxy wars 133 between the
West and East, such as those in Indochina, Afghanistan, Central America, the Horn of Africa,
and Southern Africa. 134 During this period UNHCR was involved in operations on three different
continents, and as they became increasingly independent, they were given a larger budget.135
However, unlike in Europe, the functions of the Third World refugee support during this time
were not legal or diplomatic, but rather “they concerned the monetary support for and the
development of direct assistance programs for refugees
In Africa specifically, refugees were more often self-settled and were able to integrate
into the host communities with little or no problems, so much of UNHCR assistance in the 1960s
was targeted at emergency aid rather than repatriation. 136 However, as these new refugees began
to emerge, the temporal limit of the 1951 Convention, which made protection limited to those
displaced prior to 1951, started to become problematic to UNHCR efforts. 137
In 1967, in response to the “globalization” of the refugee issue, a protocol was added to the
1951 Convention,

138

which made the Convention apply to persons displaced after 1951 and

allowing them to benefit from its protections. The 1967 Protocol, however, was a separate
instrument, which required a separate signature and ratification process. States are not required
to sign the protocol, although most have. Overall the 1951 Convention did not change, although
more persons (namely non-Europeans) were now included under its protection. Other regional
definitions were created based on the 1951 Convention definition which broadened the definition
of who can be a refugee, acknowledging the regional needs (and the realities of refugee
production), the most important of which is the definition adopted in the 1969 Organization of
African Unity (OAU) Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, signed by the Organization of American States in
132
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1984. Both of these documents, and specifically their refugee definitions, will be discussed in
Part III.
The 1951 Convention is one of the most widely-ratified international law instruments.
Through previous sections, which traced the various definitions and approaches to refugee
protection during the thirty year period of World War I and World War II, one can see that the
concept and definition of a refugee is a “malleable legal concept which can take on different
meanings as required by the nature and scope of the dilemma prompting involuntary
migration.” 139 However, the 1951 Convention definition that was created for refugees displaced
in Europe as a result of war has proved the most enduring and is still used today, with no changes
to the original text. So one must then ask, has the legal concept of refugee ceased to be as
malleable, flexible and responsive to contemporary realities as it was before 1951? Is it possible
for such an instrument to properly protect non-European peoples that are forcibly displaced?
PART II: CRITIQUES AND REFORMS
The consequences of demarcating the concept of ‘refugee’ are more than merely
definitional. The definition affects political processes, shapes legal discourse, highlights certain
motivations of governments, attributes causality and responsibility for displacement, and asserts
the priorities and limits of humanitarianism, among other things. As Shacknove states,
‘refugeehood’ goes beyond a simple definition, as having this definition is predicated on the
moral idea that there is a minimal, normalized “relation of rights and duties between the citizen
and the state, the negation of which engenders refugees.” as well as an empirical claim in which
the consequences of this bond being broken is persecution and alienage. 140
However, since the end of the Cold War, refugees are no longer necessarily in easily
defined ‘acceptable categories’ that were envisioned upon drafting the 1951 Convention.
International refugee law was created as a response to assist the victims of World War II, and has
not been able to accommodate the “contemporary realities of mass exodus,” which are
predominantly a matter of economics and governments’ political strategies. 141
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The refugee definition found in the 1951 Convention was a product of World War II and
the Cold War, and is Euro-centric in its focus, as the displaced persons in question were
European, displaced within Europe.142 Upon its creation states did not contemplate (or intend)
for it to be a universally applicable instrument or standard, as the Convention was limited to the
events happening prior to 1951. The definition was created to fit a “foreseeable number of
beneficiaries who fell in the acceptable categories.” 143 The system of refugee protection that was
designed for post-World War II refugees is still used today. However, the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol, 144 which are the cornerstone of international refugee law, have arguably failed to
meet the needs of the ever-changing demographics of affected populations seeking protection.
Since the end of the Cold War, although more migrants and displaced persons began to
arrive in the countries of the global north from the global south, the Convention has not been
applied so as to offer adequate protection to these migrants. Instead, since the Cold War ended,
the definition has been interpreted more strictly by northern states, creating the phenomenon of
the non-entrée state.145 These persons represented different situations of displacement when
compared to Europe during World Wars I and II and the Cold War, and in response a change
occurred in the regime charged with the protection of refugees. In an attempt to make the 1951
Convention relate to contemporary displacement, refugee status and protection has acquired
various new definitions, standards, and labels. However, many of these labels and standards
come at the cost of meaningful protection. As a reaction to the policy changes regarding
refugees, many academics have proposed ways in which refugee law can be enhanced, usually
either through underscoring the human rights and humanitarian element of international refugee
law, or through reconfiguring communication within the refugee regime.
In order to see the holes within international refugee protection, it is important to
understand the dominant critiques and varied interpretations of meaningful protection. The
critiques also shed light on the reality of the refugee regime, specifically that most of the policy
and financial control lies in the global north. This power divide has direct impacts on the
protection of refugees originating from impoverished countries of the global south.
142

Jerzy Sztucki, "Who is a Refugee? The Convention definition: Universal or Obsolete?," in Refugee
Rights and Realities, eds. Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey (West Nyack, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 55-56.
143
Ibid., 57.
144
Hereafter ‘1951 Convention’ will imply both the Convention and the 1967 Protocol, unless otherwise
specified.
145
Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South.”

24

The Post-Cold War Change and the Non-Entrée Regime
Prior to the mid-1980s, towards the end of the Cold War, the obligation to help refugees,
as victims of war, was for the most part unchallenged, as a ‘refugee’ was well-defined as a
person outside of their country of residence due to a well-founded fear of persecution, and there
was no question as to who the persecutor was.146 Up until the mid-1980s, most of the refugees
that made their way into Western Europe shared similar cultural and ideological values, namely
anti-Communism and anti-fascism, and according to many scholars, this ideological affiliation
was enough for the host society to be generally accepting of refugees, 147 and the refugee
movement in the Third World was largely contained there. However, during the 1980s an
increasing amount of asyulm seekers were arriving from the Third World, or more specifically,
from countries that were impoverished and culturally different, compared to the refugees that had
previously arrived in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
during the periods after and during World War II, as well as during the Cold War. 148
These new refugees that were entering the First World “no longer possessed ideological
or political value,” 149 as many were fleeing conflicts that had less direct impact or geopolitical
relevance on the host society; there was also a less clear indication of persecution and persecutor
than there was in the past. Rather than ideological and political assets, these new refugees were
now considered liabilities, 150 and were unwanted by the host societies, as their presence did not
service a larger political goal.
The arrival of these new refugees marked a shift in international refugee law, which
worked through the construction of the “myth of difference,” which is the idea that “the nature
and character of refugee flows in the Third World were represented as being radically different
from the refugee flows in Europe since the end of the First World War,” and in so doing an
image of a ‘normal’ refugee was constructed as “white, male and anti-communist,” which
contrasted sharply with the new refugees that were entering from the global south.151
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After the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, travel was much easier as
borders were easier to cross, which also meant that the number of refugee claims increased. 152 In
response to the increase in international migration, states began to tighten their border controls
and immigration policies, as well as restricting asylum policies. The increasing amount of
migrants and refugees from the global south and Eastern Europe that were different in terms of
culture, ethnicity, religion, or language, in comparison to the inter-war periods, made a more
clearly defined migrant ‘other’ in the mind of the public, and challenged the cultural identity of
many countries as migration rates rose. 153 Concerns for security became the justification behind
many of these border restrictions at the forefront of immigration control, and the terrorist attacks
that took place in 2001 gave governments the further justification to put concerns of security at
the forefront of the immigration debate, and develop policies that matched these concerns. 154
With the advancement of border and visa technology and territories reconfigured in terms of
immigration responsibility, we have created what is often referred to as the “non-entrée regime,”
155

which describes the reformulation of refugee policy in the post-Cold-War era, consisting of

restrictive measures that prevent asylum seekers and international migrants from entry into the
territory, as well as limiting the number of recognized refugees.
Many refugees enter territory in the same way as international migrants, and seeking
protection is now more difficult as many states have minimized claims to refugee status by
enforcing stricter visa, transportation and other access controls into the territory. 156 Today,
governments are concerned with how porous their borders are, and are constantly developing
new measures to better manage borders. 157 Going hand-in-hand with the rhetoric of the nonentrée regime is the way in which some countries have ‘expanded’ their borders or utilized
‘remote control’ mechanisms by implementing extraterritorial immigration control mechanisms.
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State authorities use these expansions “[t]o check the legality of people’s movement before they
embark, with the help of the local authorities and with air or land carriers, avoid[ing] the painful
and expensive problems in sending them back if they are not the one who should be
travelling.” 158 The most well-known systems of this sort are the most sought after destinations of
asylum-seekers of the European Union countries, the United States, and Australia.

The EU’s

external border agency, known as FRONTEX, is tasked with protecting the external borders of
the EU states, namely the southern Mediterranean border, to prevent irregular migrants entering
primarily from North and West Africa. 159 In the United States this can be seen with the
interdiction policies it has with countries in the Caribbean, namely Cuba, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, which began in the 1980s. These policies allow the US to intercept boats
with migrants coming from these countries, and send them back to that particular country or
detain them in facilities such as the notorious Guantanamo Bay until their claim for protection
has been heard. 160 Similar to the US, is Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’, which is “mainly
concerned with vessels arriving from Indonesia, and typically involved migrants with plausible
claims to protection as refugees”, 161 coming mainly from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka,
with extraterritorial processing taking place in Nauru and on Manus Island in Papua New
Guinea. 162
For many persons coming from refugee producing countries, whether they are migrants,
refugees, or even just tourists, obtaining a visa to legally enter countries of the global north,
particularly within the EU, US and Australia, is difficult, as restrictions are imposed on the
applicant, including proof of the financial resources to maintain a temporary stay in the

158

Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo, “The Transformation of European Border Controls,” in Extraterritorial
Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, ed. Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas. (The Netherlands: Brill, 2010),
1.
159
For more information regarding the operations of FRONTEX and the implications of many of their
coordinated efforts, see: Guild and Bigo, “The Transformation of European Border Controls,” 14-27.
160
Ryan, “Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees?,” 3-38.
161
Ibid., 28
162
The ‘Pacific Solution’ came about after a controversial incident that took place in 2001 in which the
Norwegian commercial ship, the Tampa, entered into Australian waters with 433 migrants, who were primarily
Afghan and Iraqi, which was refused entry into the harbor; the government eventually took control of the ship and
took the migrants to New Zealand and Nauru for processing, which began the policy of extraterritorial processing.
This policy was changed in 2008, and extraterritorial processing now occurs on Christmas Island, however it still
lies outside of the territory of Australia, meaning that claims to asylum are still assessed outside the standard legal
mechanisms. For more information see: Ryan, “Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal
Guarantees?,” 3-38. and Karin Fathimath Afeef, “The Politics of Extraterritorial Processing: Offshore Asylum
Policies in Europe and the Pacific,” Refugee Studies Center Working Paper Series no. 36 (October 2006): 4.

27

country. 163 These new restrictive measures, including extraterritorial processing, have led asylum
to become increasingly treated like irregular migration, as legal entry into the country is more
difficult, however, it is important to maintain that refugees are not irregular migrants. 164
Refugee law, in theory, has protection mechanisms 165 in place to ensure that persons entering
territory who have a claim to refugee status should be attended to in accordance with
international law; and with these protections, it is “completely inappropriate to stigmatize
refugees arriving without visas as law breakers when a treaty we have freely signed provides
exactly the contrary.” 166 With the exception of international refugee law, international law
largely ignores issues of migration, 167 and states are free to open and close their borders as they
see fit. As the world continues to globalize and become more open in terms or trade and capital,
control over population movement has become the last stronghold of territorial sovereignty,
which wealthy refugee receiving countries in the global north guard with fierce politics and large
budgets. 168
In response to the general increase of international migrants, states have prioritized ideas
of state sovereignty, security and cultural preservation over international obligations to protect
and provide asylum to refugees. The establishment of refugee law was to legitimate the
protectionist norm, while also creating a “reasonable accommodation between the inevitability of
special claims and the sovereignty of the states to which those claims are addressed.” 169
However, placing asylum-seekers into the broader category of international migration has had
devastating effects on the protection that they are able to receive; when asylum seekers are
treated as international migrants, the ‘protectionist norm’ inherent in refugee law is lost.
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International refugee law is based on a humanitarian premise. 170 However, today the
refugee regime in the global north is “fundamentally concerned with the protection of powerful
states.” 171 The discussion of refugees is no longer one of protection for the refugee, but rather
protection of the state, through policies (or at least policies in practice) that reinforce the
sovereignty of the nation state, as mentioned above. Refugee law and policy has moved from its
humanitarian foundation to the preservation and reaffirmation of State’s power, many times at
the cost of protection. With the increase (and perceived fear) of international migration and
refugee movement towards the global north, as well as the ‘undesirable’ socio-economic make
up of these movements, and the real difficulties in distinguishing between those who are refugees
and those who are economic migrants, keeping in mind that two categories are not mutually
exclusive. Governments have begun to treat migration policy and refugee policy as though they
are one.
Definitions, Labels and Navigating the System
According to Rees “refugee and asylum laws arise precisely from the recognition that
there may be people whom [the global north] would otherwise not admit as immigrants, but who
need protection”. 172 Given that contemporary migration policies work to restrict entry to specific
types of migrants,

as well as the lack of consistency in application of refugee status

determination procedures across states, it seems that refugee law, rather than a tool for
protection, is potentially being utilized to deny entry and/or legal stay in the country.
The right to leave a country where there is a well-founded fear of persecution, and seek
asylum 173 in another country is, in theory, still there, but has become more difficult to implement
and realize. 174 Rather than a right, refugee status is now a privileged status, as governments have
become more restrictive in who can claim this status, arguing that asylum claims are abused by
economic migrants to gain entry into the host country. 175 Now, rather than simply being a
‘refugee,’ there is a wide array of labels that an asylum-seeker can receive in many countries.
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Zetter discusses this issue at length in terms of the “refugee label,” or rather the difficulty in
receiving this label. 176 Several countries in the global north have remade the refugee label, and
rather than a tool for protection, it has become much more blurred, as it has been “buried in the
apparently neutral, apolitical requirements of immigration procedures and bureaucracies which
are part of the much larger apparatus of state power and state interests,”177 essentially
intertwining the refugee process into the larger body of migration, and are “the tangible
representation of [government] policies and programs.” 178
Further “burying” the refugee label is the creation of new labels in the processing chain,
most notably “temporary protection.” Temporary protection is sometimes viewed positively, as it
fills the protection gap for those forced migrants who do not fit into the 1951 Convention
criteria, often fleeing generalized violence, as this protection is often granted on an ad hoc basis
to specific groups of refugees. 179 However, the reality is that in some countries temporary
protection is often used as a substitute protection and as a “restrictive mechanism to reduce
refugee rights and prevent integration.” 180 Persons who receive temporary protection often
receive fewer rights than ‘Convention refugees,’ and these actions could arguably be seen as a
threat to the 1951 Convention, and can “form part of a strategy to de-legalize refugee protection
and to relocate it in the realm of politics and humanitarian assistance.” 181 Temporary protection
thus has the potential to make refugee protection, and the rights granted in the 1951 Convention,
cease to be an international legal obligation through creating a loophole of sorts, which can
“intercept access to the most prized claim:” refugee status.182
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However getting access to the prized label of a ‘refugee’ (or any label for that matter)
means navigating through a system that was created for a very different type of displacement
situation than those experienced by current refugee flows. As stated previously, since the end of
the Cold War, refugee flows have been predominately coming from the global south, and those
that do make it to the territory of the wealthier countries of the global north, often differ
culturally, religiously, and linguistically than the host society. The refugee definition found in the
1951 Convention was written at a time and under conditions that were different. This creates
questions of whether or not the 1951 Convention and the rights granted therein can be practically
applied in today’s society.
Some will argue that the definition is not out of date because it is broad enough to
encompass any type of persecution, as well as the fact that the 1951 Convention “remains the
sole, legally binding, international instrument providing specific protection to refugees.” 183 The
1951 Convention has, in fact, created the basis of the international response to forced migration
and is one of the most widely accepted international legal instruments. 184 In order for a definition
to be universal, as this refugee definition is supposed to be it must not be too detailed or precise,
in order to be flexible. However one can also argue that the drafters of the definition “eventually
abandoned efforts to be more precise, because they already had a clear understanding of whom
they had in mind [for protection].” 185
When mass flows of refugees and forced migrants move from, for example, Burma to
Thailand, from Rwanda into Burundi, or from Sudan to Chad, “we are prepared to assume that
they are refugees, or even that they should be considered as such despite not fitting within the
letter of the law.” However, when movements happen closer to home, countries in the global
north often assume the opposite. 186 As discussed previously, governments have worked hard and
spent a lot of money to try to limit entry by undesirable migrants which, also limits entry to
asylum-seekers. If the asylum-seeker does reach the territory, he/she must navigate themself
through a complicated, formalized and individualized system to determine their status.
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Interpreting the definition
The process of receiving one of many labels in the global north, as well as in many
countries in the global south, is marked by a lengthy court hearing, in which facts are checked,
stories are tested, and all efforts are made to ensure that the person who is claiming asylum is a
bona fide refugee. Asylum-seekers often find themselves in a system that is over-legalized, and
“often mires the process in a legal formalism that divorces procedures from humanitarianism.” 187
What is lacking in the current systems of refugee status determination (RSD) is consistency and
predictability, which is important to any legal system being implemented in an effective manner.
Without consistency and predictability, questions arise as to fairness, as well as the effectiveness
of the protection system.
The first obstacle is whether or not the asylum-seeker fits into the parameters set forth in
the 1951 Convention definition, which is the definition utilized in most refugee systems in the
global north.188 Interpreting the refugee definition is a recognized problem. The definition used
in the 1951 Convention has become more muddled than ever, as who is defining and why creates
a wide array of definitions. Definitions vary as governments, lawyers, and others “manipulate the
interpretation within relatively complicated legal terms.” 189 In theory, the definition in the 1951
Convention could be interpreted more broadly to offer protection to wider array of persons, but
the reality is in fact the opposite.
Due to the fact that the refugee definition found in the 1951 Convention could be
interpreted broadly, as well as restrictively, “virtually every work of the core phrase of the
refugee definition has been subject to interpretive dispute” 190 in order to ensure that all possible
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meanings (and restrictions) are understood. To understand how the definition is now applied, it is
important to go over the main portions that are interpreted. Generally speaking, a person must
meet three interrelated conditions in order to garner refugee status: 191 being abroad, 192 the fear of
persecution, and the lack of protection.
The beginning of the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention states that a refugee is a
person who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted.” 193 The meaning of ‘persecution’ and
‘well-founded fear’ are constantly challenged and analyzed. As these terms are not defined
clearly in the 1951 Convention or other international instruments, academics, lawyers, and others
are constantly working out what meaning should be attributed to the terms ‘well-founded fear’
and ‘persecution.’ The element of a well-founded fear of persecution “is clearly the most
important factor concerning the determination of refugee status”, as the “other elements of the
definition i.e. outside the country of origin, nationality, or habitual residence, coupled with
unwillingness to return are essentially questions of fact.” 194 Thus persecution and well-founded
fear are the elements that indicate whether these questions of fact are relevant to receiving
protection.
The term ‘persecution’ first entered international relations with regard to refugees in the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which, as discussed in the previous
chapter, was an organization created in 1946 to deal with the issue of World War II refugees. 195
There seems to be no apparent or specific reason for the use of the word ‘persecution’ in the IRO
draft constitution, but its purpose was to define those persons who would have valid objections to
returning to their home country and thus would allow them to fall under the mandate of the
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IRO. 196 The term ‘persecution’ was also included in the UNHCR Statute and the 1951
Convention, “almost automatically, and without any discussion of its substantive meaning.” 197
However, today this term has been given much attention. It is out of the purview of this paper to
fully explore this issue. However it is important to have a general understanding of what this
term implies (or does not imply) in international legal procedures. The international refugee law
academic community gives much weight to the works of Alte Grahl-Madsen, James C.
Hathaway and Guy Goodwin-Gill. 198

However, among these leading scholars, a unified

understanding of ‘persecution’ is not evident.
The more conservative reading of the meaning of ‘persecution’ is a threat to life or
freedom (i.e., death/execution, arbitrary detention, torture, etc.), predominately for a political
reason (in line with the idea of refugees as ‘political refugees’), 199 whereas the more broad
interpretation of ‘persecution’ is any sort of sustained violation of human rights. 200 There is no
consensus to what this term exactly means, however certain general ideas accepted by most
scholars 201 is that persecution indicates a failure of state protection, risk to civil and political
rights 202, and risk to (some) economic social and cultural rights. 203
When analyzing the construction of the 1951 Convention definition, Jackson adds to this
discussion, stating that “[i]n any event, the notion of ‘persecution’ was not introduced in order to
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restrict the refugee concept as hitherto understood.” 204 Perhaps the debate is simply a game of
semantics, a pointless exercise into the ‘true meaning’ of a word, especially as Weis, who was
present at the drafting of the Convention has stated, “[a]s one who participated in the drafting of
the convention, I can say that the drafters did not have specific restrictions in mind when they
used this terminology. Theirs was an effort to express in legal terms what is generally considered
a political refugee.” 205 This is probably the case as ‘political refugees’ were the refugees that the
1951 Convention was written for.
Persecution, regardless of what it means, must be proven to be real, which is done
through the notion of having ‘well-founded fear.’ In discussing the concept of well-founded fear,
Weiss summarizes the viewpoint of Grahl-Madsen, stating that “the adjective 'well-founded'
connoted a fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution . . . this term suggests that it is not
the frame of mind of the person concerned which is decisive for her or his claim to refugee
status, but that this claim should be measured with a more objective yardstick.” 206 This
‘yardstick’ measures elements such as fear, understood as a “forward-looking expectation of
risk”, and “[o]nce fear so conceived is voiced by the act of seeking protection, it falls to the state
party assessing refugee status to determine whether that expectation is borne out by the actual
circumstances of the case.” 207 Fear is then evaluated as to whether or not it is valid, or ‘wellfounded’, through looking at “all forms of material evidence” (i.e. news media, human rights
reports, and other available and reliable country information), as well as personal testimony from
the individual, if it is found to be credible. 208 There have also been substantial court cases in
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several countries that have shaped and structured how the concept of a well-founded fear of
persecution is tested and tried. 209
This attention to every detail of the definition, more particularly to this short phrase,
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted,” may also indicate that the definition does
not work for all groups of refugees, particularly modern refugee flows. Every part of the
definition is manipulated and reconfigured, including how a well–founded fear of persecution
relates to the five grounds of persecution: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social groups, and political opinion. 210
Perhaps it was the intention of the drafters to leave the definition of a refugee, and the
terminology used ambiguous, in order to maximize its breadth. However, its effect today has
been the opposite, as many governments, particularly in the global north utilize this ambiguity to
apply the convention definition restrictively. RSD procedures and the application of the
convention definition are now caught up in a legal formalism, that have “fallen prey to an
emphasis on legal abstraction, often in disregard of the reality that exists in the asylum seeker's
country of origin . . . [t]he asylum seeker's personal reality, crucial in refugee status
determination, is under-emphasized . . . [and] one dangerous consequence is that determination
systems become vulnerable to politicization.” 211 Rather than the humanitarian aims of the
definition, and for that matter the Convention, facts are now the key to protection, rather than
need or fear of the person seeking said protection. This is not to say that facts are not useful, but
in many asylum cases, facts are difficult to prove.
contemporary RSD hearings is to

According to Barsky, the purpose of
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narrow the refugee claimant down to the stated grounds for his/her claim so that a
decision can be made on the case, so the legal grill or template which is applied to
evaluate the legitimacy (the kind of persecution suffered) is limited in such a way that
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it produces a narrative which speaks of a very small and extremely problematic
segment of the refugee’s experience.

The legal sphere in which RSD hearings are heard creates a space in which a decision is
made on limited facts, sometimes separated from the larger picture or produces a picture
victimization which is dehumanizing (as will be discussed further later in the thesis), but is often
central to either receiving protection or being rejected.
Barsky’s central argument is that in order to be successful in obtaining refugee status the
person must match their description of events as closely as possible to what the legal authorities
deem to be admissible; a claimants hearing “will be successful to the degree that he is able to
create an Other 213 (as Convention refugee) that is productive within the context to which he is
speaking.” 214 Essentially, persons wishing to seek asylum must make their claim fit within the
definition found in the 1951 Convention, constructing a narrative that fits pre-set criteria based
on facts. The problematic issue associated with the “policy of haggling over tiny details with
dramatically persecuted persons . . . is that the veracity of the entire claim is put into question by
ultimately inconsequential (but verifiable) details.” 215 As a result of this fact-finding tactic,
“decision-makers often fail to link the purely structural legal criteria with the level of
background and information necessary to allow these concepts to acquire a relevant content,”216
essentially making it more difficult to have a neutral decision. Although Barsky wrote
specifically of the Canadian system, his analysis rings true for many of the systems in global
north. The systems in place attempt to formalize and make the subjective objective, while often
ignoring the perceptual differences between the applicant and decision-makers. Barsky explains
it best, stating that, 217
[r]efugee hearings are a peculiar hybrid of courtroom-style interrogation, loosely structured storytelling, and inter-cultural discussions involving bureaucrats (who rarely exhibit an understanding
of the Third World countries from which most refugees come) and claimants (who generally
exhibit as little understanding of the host country as the bureaucrats do of the country of origin).
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As national governments in the global north handle the refugee processing independent
from UNHCR, labels that are created and given may represent a wider political agenda, which in
contemporary times is aimed at limiting entry to undesirable foreigners or meeting ulterior
political and policy motives. Arboleda and Hoy argue that in order to truly abide by the 1951
Convention refugee definition, states, particularly northern states, must agree on “standards for
fair, predictable and effective refugee determination systems” which is contingent on a clear
refugee definition and interpretation. 218 Rather than being driven by legal and political desires,
RSD procedures should be reformulated outside of the legal formalism that is has been built
around, as well as the issue that concern for the numbers associated with recognition rates tends
to trump the need for consistent and fair application and implementation of the 1951
Convention. 219
Making Refugee Protection Meaningful
Although states freely sign the 1951 Convention, the discussion about reformulating
refugee policies is taking place because states see the current policies as “insufficiently attentive
to their sovereign right to exclude aliens.”

220

For other groups working in refugee aid and

advocacy, the current refugee definition is seen as limiting and too restrictive to account for all
those who should benefit from protection. 221 Refugee law is in crisis as most interested parties,
despite their disparate interests, agree that the international refugee law system as it exists today
is problematic and needs reform. Several academics have suggested ways in which refugee law
should be reframed or readdressed to better protect refugees, which are reviewed below.
Reform through Human Rights
Hathaway suggests that refugee law should be reassessed in terms of human rights
protection. 222 The current refugee definition found in article 1 of the 1951 Convention, in the
view of Hathaway, is limiting as these grounds are not adequate enough to encompass all those
218
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who require protection because they have been forced to migrate. This author asserts that the
drafters of the 1951 Convention “intentionally left the meaning of ‘persecution’ undefined
because they realized the impossibility of enumerating in advance all of the forms of
maltreatment” which might legitimate a person’s claim to foreign protection. 223 Hathaway
suggests that fear of persecution can remain a meaningful concept if reinterpreted more towards
the failure of basic state protection, demonstrated through the denial of fundamental,
internationally recognized human rights, and that “any person whose basic human dignity is at
risk in her home state must be empowered to leave the abusive situation. Refugee law should be
an effective means of enabling persons to disengage from states which have forfeited their claim
to international legitimacy by failure to adhere to basic standards of human rights law.” 224
In this human rights model, persecution is seen as failure of state protection. This is
similar to Shacknove, who states that “persecution is but one manifestation of a broader
phenomenon: the absence of state protection of the citizen's basic needs.” 225 For Hathaway, the
conceptual weakness of the 1951 Convention definition is the requirement that the well-founded
fear of persecution be derived from reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion. 226 Hathaway goes into more detail regarding the
fundamental concepts in this reformulation, including the problem areas, specifically the issue of
the willingness of states to broaden the current parameters for defining a refugee, as that would
create a higher rate of “Convention refugees” in the state, which is not something that most states
would deem as desirable.
The 1951 Convention does grant certain rights to refugees that are articulated in other
human rights instruments including freedom of religion, 227 non-discrimination, 228 freedom of
association, 229 freedom of movement, 230 employment and labor rights,231 as well as the
obligation of states to issue identity papers and travel documents 232 and facilitate assimilation

223

Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 122.
Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 120.
225
Shacknove, “Who is a Refugee?,” 277.
226
Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,” 123.
227
UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” Article 4.
228
Ibid., Article 3.
229
Ibid., Article 15.
230
Ibid., Article 26.
231
Ibid., Articles 17-19.
232
Ibid., Articles 27-28.
224

39

and naturalization. 233 Re-emphasizing the human rights side of the 1951 Convention and of
refugee protection is important in preventing refugee law and RSD procedures from becoming
over-legalized or buried within immigration procedures and policies, as was discussed earlier.
Thus, drawing attention to the human rights roots of the 1951 Convention has the potential,
according to some academics, to make refugee protection more meaningful, without changing
the actual text of the Convention. 234
Reforming through communication and burden sharing
Garvey suggests that in order for the refugee system to be relevant and effective, it must
rest on inter-state accountability, 235 creating a “binding regime of international burdensharing.” 236 Unlike Hathaway, Garvey does not see human rights as the best option to better
protect refugees, although he recognizes that “refugee crises are naturally infused with the
rhetoric of human rights,” he believes that “human rights principles embody ends, not means,”
rather today’s refugee crisis must address state-to-state relations. 237 In Garvey’s view, refugee
law “reaches a dead end” as human rights law because it clashes with the principle of national
sovereignty, and the misuse of human rights law “as the exclusive legal basis for dealing with
mass exodus leads only to unproductive rhetoric and recrimination.” 238 Generally speaking,
human rights law is consistently compromised because the principle of national sovereignty in
international law gives states exclusive control over the individuals within its territory.
On the other hand, Chimni’s reform represents the view of the global south. Chimni
believes that a fundamental issue in international refugee law and policy today is that laws and
policies have been predominantly drafted and shaped by states and scholars from the global
north, without consultation with governments and scholars of the global south and, most
significantly, silencing the voices of refugees themselves. 239 Likewise, UNHCR has moved away
233
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from its past positions on important issues, such as voluntary repatriation, and involved itself
more with internally displaced persons without “entering into a sustained dialogue” with states
and scholars in the global south or southern NGOs. 240 The unilateralism of the global north and
UNHCR has had a profoundly negative impact on refugee protection. To improve refugee
protection, Chimni suggests a “dialogic model” that proposes communication “on a continuous
and institutionalized basis between States, the civil society and UNHCR, within UNHCR, and
between concerned NGOs and governments.” 241 Opening a stronger dialogue between the
various elements of the emerging transnational society, there is potential, according to Chimni, to
safeguard core protection principles for refugees. Chimni’s reforms and ideas are rooted in the
social inequalities between the global north and south, representing one of the few reforms that
emphasize the effects the current state of global inequality has on refugee protection, which will
be discussed further in the following Part III.
Chimni argues that the refugee regime today, with UNHCR at the fore, has moved
towards the policy of containment, through which they encourage regional containment of
refugees (such as in neighboring countries) and repatriation, over resettlement or movement to
the global north. 242 Voluntary repatriation is seen as the ideal solution, and has been
identification as the humane solution, often leading to its pursuit even when it is not appropriate
(i.e. without full research of safety and security in the country of origin) or indeed voluntary. 243
Chimni also articulates the changing role of UNHCR within refugee policies in the global north,
specifically how they have coped with the fact that refugees are no longer welcome in the global
north. The northern states are the largest donors to UNHCR, and the UNHCR mandate and
policies have been adjusted, showing that “UNHCR is an uncritical consumer of concepts and
theories which support a particular (northern) vision of the global refugee order.”244 As UNHCR
is arguably the ‘guardian’ of refugee law and policy, their seeming alliance with the global north
by remaining silent, or at least not openly criticizing, the way in which policy is implemented in
these countries can be very problematic. The dependence that UNHCR has on donations from
the states in the global north also shows the limitations of the organization’s sphere of influence
and ability to influence policy in the north.
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The majority of refugee movement (flight and asylum) takes place in states located in the
global south, and many states in the global north are working to keep that movement contained
in the south and away from their countries’ borders. With this reality in place, as well as the shift
of UNHCR’s policies, as discussed above, reformulations on how ‘burden sharing’ and resource
allocation can be better distributed have emerged. Kritzman-Amir addresses the issue of burden
sharing by asking the question “when refugees leave their country of nationality, which country
is responsible for protecting and providing for them?” 245 For many refugees coming from the
global south, they first seek refuge in a neighboring country, which is not likely to provide them
functional protection, and the ability to exercise their human rights and the reality is that only a
small percentage of refugees are able to reach countries that have the resources to provide them
with adequate protection.
Kritzman-Amir proposes several mechanisms for burden-sharing, all of which are
connected to a state’s moral obligation to assist. Refugee protection is expensive, as it requires
countries to allocate resources to meet the basic needs of refugees, which is something that many
countries in the global south do not have. In the opinion of Kritzman-Amir, there is “no moral
justification for these costs to be disproportionately borne by some countries and not others,”
however there are not incentives for states to create fair responsibility-sharing mechanisms,
which is primarily the result of the lack of political influence that many of the refugee hosting
countries in the global south. 246 Overall, this article addresses an important sub-issue in many of
the other proposals to reformulate how refugee issues are addressed by host countries, drawing
out the disconnect between the global north and south, specifically regarding resources.
Hathaway and Neve produced another reformulation of refugee law that proposes a
“solution oriented protection” that is based in a human rights framework. Rather than addressing
or reformulating the status quo of the refugee regime, recognizing that states will not adhere to
policies that will potentially increase migration into their countries, they propose ways in which
better protection can be realized in regional protection schemes. 247 Recognizing that refugee
status is intended to be a temporary status, not a “back door to permanent immigration,” this
proposal also advocates for temporary protection, as it is “concerned to safeguard human dignity
245
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only until and unless the home state is able to effectively resume its primary duty of protection,”
therefore if temporary protection is conceived in a “rights-regarding and solution-oriented
manner” refugees will be able to return home when it is appropriate. 248
Hathaway and Neve’s proposal also rests on enhanced burden sharing between states, and
the “duty to equitably share the responsibilities and burdens of refugee protection.” 249 Under this
proposed “regime of common responsibility,” certain countries (what is called the “interestconvergence” group) agree in advance to contribute to protect refugees who arrive to the territory
of any of the member states. 250 The idea behind this ‘interest-convergence group’ is to
disassociate the site of arrival from the country of asylum. The idea is that if the protection
mechanisms in the global south are strengthened, the global north will have a significant
reduction in asylum claims, particularly fraudulent asylum claims, and would be able to
dismantle some of the ‘non-entrée’ mechanisms. The savings from the reduction of money spent
on asylum claims could then be directed to the protection of refugees in the global south. 251 In
other words, the global north has the resources for better protection and the south as the capacity
(in regards to the regional proximity to the refugee flows) to absorb the refugees.
However this ‘solution-oriented’ proposal has some essential flaws, which have been
discussed by Chimni, Anker, Fitzpatrick, and Shacknove.
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Of particular concern is the

emphasis on regional protection. By advocating for regional protection and reducing the amount
of asylum claims in the global north, this system allows the states of the global north use the
structural inequalities between the north and south, which they have constructed and sustained,
to their advantage; 253 the north is able to reduce asylum claims and responsibility to protect
refugees on their territory. Also, the regional protection proposed by Hathaway is dependent on
consistent funds from states in the global north. However, once the refugees are contained in a
regional protection framework, it is not likely that the states in the global north will feel as
compelled to fund the operations. 254 The conception of burden sharing, or the “refugee-resource
transaction” in this proposal “turns the refugee into a commodity which can be 'traded' on the
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world market,” 255 removing the asylum seeker from the sphere of law. The additional fear is that
the emphasis on temporary protection in poorer countries of the global south will erode the
human rights and welfare standards in the 1951 Convention rather than strengthen them. 256 In
general, this model moves away from the core of the Convention, which is the right to personal
protection and to regain human dignity, as it “suppresses the moral individuality of forced
migrants,” which has “moral costs.” 257
Moral and Humanitarian Arguments
The moral, humanitarian argument for refugee protection is something that can be seen in
many proposals (as indicated above) for bettering refugee protection. Most governments will in
fact acknowledge the importance of refugee protection, but they do not want it happening on
their soil. Gibney articulated this disjunction in his book, stating that
a kind of schizophrenia seems to pervade Western responses to asylum seekers and refugees;
great importance is attached to the principle of asylum but enormous efforts are made to ensure
that refugees (and others with less pressing claims) never reach the territory of the state where
they could receive protection. 258

This excerpt suggests that the recognition for the need and purpose of asylum is one
shared by most states, and suggests that it is possible to base a reformulation of refugee law on
this shared moral value. All of the above suggestions for readdressing refugee law and policy rest
primarily on increased burden-sharing and communication among states, and Gibney’s book,
The Ethics and Politics of Asylum adds to this literature by grounding this reformulation in the
ethical, primarily utilizing the idea of ‘humanitarianism,’ and interacting with issue of what
duties states have towards refugees. Gibney suggests that the principle of humanitarianism in
relation to refugee protection, holds that “states have an obligation to assist refugees when the
costs of doing so are low,” understanding ‘low costs’ as “a way of keeping the sacrifices required
of citizens at a minimum to reduce the likelihood of backlash.” 259 This is a simplified description
of Gibney’s ideas, however the basic claim is clear, which is that this approach will better
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realistically call on states to uphold this ‘moral duty,’ as it is flexible enough to be applied
differently from state to state. Gibney sees the flaws in this idea, as calling upon
humanitarianism will not account for the other political realities that compromise and shape this
ethical responsibility, however he believes that “the humanitarian principle might move these
states closer to realizing the values they claim to live by now.” 260 However, this idea has the
potential to suffer similar criticism as Hathaway and Neve, as the as obligation to protect is put
in terms of cost and benefit, and moves away from legal responsibilities, as well as removing the
refugee from law.
Is it enough?
Many of these reforms and critiques, aside from Chimni, neglect the externalist
component of refuge protection or, in other words, they have neglected to place the responsibility
that the global north has in creating conditions that generate refugee flows. The externalist
explanation assigns “blame between the state from which refugees flee and states responsible for
authoring policies or undertaking action leading to the outflow of refugees.” 261 The focus on the
internal cause of refugee flows and forced migration creates a lack of international accountability
and a system in which “prevention is preferable to cure.” 262 The methods of ‘prevention,’ namely
human rights and humanitarianism, are problematic in reaffirming a focus on internal causes of
refugee production, among other problems, which will be discussed in Part III.
Many of the proposals for reformulating refugee protection are in line with the idea of the
“Convention Plus” approach adopted by UNHCR. This initiative acknowledges that, although
important in defining state responsibilities to refugees, the 1951 Convention “cannot address all
the pressing issues pertaining to refugee protection in today’s changing world.” 263 The
Convention Plus agreement includes multilateral special agreements, targeting development
assistance, 264 among other things, but with focus on enhancing protection without any suggestion
of altering the initial Convention. However, as most of these reforms are created and proposed
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without making a change to the Convention, will the call to reignite the moral force of human
rights law create actual change? Rees suggests that “the moral force of refugee policy varies with
the extent to which we identify with the refugee.” 265 As discussed in the outset of this Part, the
characteristics of the current asylum-seeking population that enter the global north are often
culturally different from the host society, and if the populations of the global north do not
identify with asylum-seekers, then the law and Convention, as it stands today, will not acquire a
strong moral force.
Most of the aforementioned attempts to re-formulate law have all done so under the
premise of working within the current system, which is the same system that much of this
literature also indicates is failing. Using the key elements that these important academics have
constructed will be a starting point to analyze a realistic and rational system of refugee
protection, which might include starting over and responding to the contemporary situation,
rather than remaining tied to the specific historical event that the 1951 Convention is grounded
in. The above existing critique is an important starting point from which I articulate my own
critique of current policies and suggested directions of reform in order to continue to usefully
rethink how refugee protection can best protect the vulnerable .
PART III: FORCED MIGRATION IN CONTEXT
In Part II and II of this paper we have seen how the refugee was created in international
law, the critiques and problems associated with the current approach to refugee law, and the
global north’s role in international refugee policy. This section aims to discuss the situation of
forced displacement in the context of global inequalities, via globalization, and the un-productive
discourse that refugee protection is mired in. Refugees have indeed become an issue of the global
south, as this is the location of the vast majority of refugee production and protection programs.
Just as ‘genuine’ refugees have become more difficult and complex to identify, so have the
causes of their displacement. What seems to be evident is that forced migration has the potential
to become yet another “part of a western project of global dominance” operating under the
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banner of globalization. 266 Part III will finish with the argument that international refugee law
has become irrelevant and an irrational system of protection in contemporary society and suggest
ways in which this issue must be rethought.
Issues of Definition
In the early years when the first treaties pertaining to refugee protection were developed,
and international efforts were coordinated for relief, an ad hoc approach was taken to classifying
certain migrants as ‘refugees.’ The definition evolved and new conventions were created that
reflected the needs of the displaced populations specific to their circumstances, or in many cases
their geographic origin. 267 From the progression that was outlined in Part I, the argument can be
made that the definition of a refugee was not rigid, but rather a fluid category that reflected the
prevailing realities of displacement, as well as the perceived protection needs of that time period.
The post-World War II refugee definition was formulated during a period of global
divide between the capitalist West and the communist East. Under this backdrop, refugees were
conceptualized by the drafters of the 1951 Convention as a product of a certain kind of political
rule, namely “oppressive, totalitarian regimes,” such as that which existed in Nazi Germany or
the states that were forming in the communist Central and Eastern Europe. 268 In this dichotomy,
the political undertone of the Convention suggests that all communist countries were repressive,
and that Western states were the only place of sanctuary for such asylum seekers. 269As European
refugee movement in this period was rooted in this divide, stateless persons and refugees
produced as a result of repressive communist regimes were welcomed in the democratic states of
the West.
Although sixty years have passed since, the 1951 Convention has remained largely
unchanged. The only major change was the addition of the 1967 Protocol, which removed the
temporal and geographic limitations of the refugee definition, effectively making the law
universal. However, the world has shifted dramatically since 1967 and the refugee definition,
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based on alienage and an individual claim to a well-founded fear of persecution based on reasons
of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group, is
irrelevant for much of the forced migration occurring in the twenty-first century. In this Part the
term ‘forced migrant’ will be used in place of ‘refugee’ because the reality is that most displaced
persons are not refugees, in the legal sense, as they do not fall into the categories of the 1951
Convention or in the extended definitions of the regional definitions found in the African and
Latin American systems. Even the term ‘forced migrant’ can be a problematic as what really
constitutes force is an important question: does force imply physical violence, or is poverty,
unemployment and lack of state welfare a reasonable conditions to constitute force? The latter is
a push factor for much of the domestic and international migration in the global south, however,
if they are not threatened for convention reasons, they are not refugees and not entitled to
international protection. It is clear that it is time to reassess the international refugee regime so
that it can more rationally protect vulnerable migrants. Today’s causes of migration transcend
simple categories such as political opinion or religious belief, but have their source in entrenched
and increasing global social and economic inequalities.
A Southern Issue?
The global refugee population peaked after the Cold War with 18.2 million at the end of
1993. 270 Since then, the number of recognized refugees has fluctuated, but has not reached this
peak thus far. At the end of 2010, UNHCR estimated that the global refugee population to be
10.55 million persons. 271 The vast majority of these refugees originate in the global south, and
the enhanced border security and immigration procedures in the global north, as well as the
policy of containment implemented by UNHCR, have kept 80% of the world’s refugees (8.5
million persons) in the global south.272 When looking at the figures, one might deduce that
refugees are not a northern issue, as the majority of refugees are produced in and remain in the
global south.
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The aforementioned numbers only take into account those who have been recognized
under the 1951 Convention as refugees, and do not accurately capture the present reality of
forced migration in the global south. In fact, refugees are part of a larger, increasingly complex
phenomenon of forced migration. In addition to the grounds outlined in the1951 Convention,
persons are forced to migrate for a number of reasons including generalized violence, war and
conflict, natural and man-made disasters, and as a result of unequal development trajectories.
Although northern states have remained firm on not expanding the definition, as it is believed to
broad enough for those who need protection (as discussed in Part II), the states in what is now
the global south have embraced more inclusive definitions for the protection of forced migrants.
Regional Definitions
The refugee was created out of a certain global dichotomy between the East and West.
The 1951 Convention largely did not reflect the reality of forced migration and displacement in
the Third World that was occurring during the same time period, as it was an instrument created
for European displacement. While the First and Second World countries were engaged in the
Cold War, much of the non-aligned Third World was experiencing large amounts of forced
displacement, particularly on the African Continent and it was soon clear that the refugee
problem was not limited to Europe. As previously discussed, the 1967 Protocol was adopted,
removing the temporal and geographic limitations of the 1951 Convention, so that the
protections offered in the Convention can be utilized in the rest of the world. However, as soon
as the concept of refugee was placed within the confines of the 1951 Convention, the definition
proved to be inadequate for many countries of the global south, where issues of forced migration
manifested differently. Soon after this definition was adopted, it needed to be changed. 273
In the 1960s, many states on the African continent had either recently decolonized, or
were in the process of doing so. This struggle for independence and decolonization, as well as
the process of conforming to colonially drawn borders and types of government and statehood, 274
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led to population displacement that was different from the five grounds listed in the 1951
Convention. In 1969 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created the Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 275 In addition to the 1951
Convention definition, the OAU Convention included as a refugee:
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality,
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place
outside his country of origin or nationality. 276

In 1984, the Latin American states created a similar definition in the Cartagena Declaration on
refugees. 277 This declaration was made in response to the large number of persons displaced as a
result of the political and military upheavals in Latin America during the late 1970s and
1980s. 278
The 1951 Convention and the regional definitions reflect different historical contexts, as
one was a response to European totalitarianism, and the other to the realities of the struggle for
independence, the dilemmas of the postcolonial state with artificially imposed borders and forms
of governance, political turmoil, and generalized violence. These definitions encompass the
individual-based persecution of the 1951 Convention, as well as groups who were fleeing from
generalized violence and civil strife. The intent of this Convention was to create a regional
definition of refugee. However, the OAU Convention in particular was also farsighted about the
world’s future challenges when it came to forced migration. 279 In addition to the inclusiveness of
this definition, the OAU Convention also challenges the notion that individual persecution is an
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essential criterion of refugeehood as “the normal bond between the citizen and the state can be
severed in diverse ways, persecution being but one.“ 280
The OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration were both created to meet regional
needs and respond to logical considerations, namely the inability to handle large waves of
displaced persons on an individual, case-by-case basis. 281 Today, while some of the causes of
migration and displacement continues to result from political persecution (as included in the
1951 Convention definition), generalized violence and civil strife (as included in the OAU and
Cartagena definitions), other causes are increasingly prevalent that do not fit into existing
international or regional legal categories.
Internally Displaced Persons
One of the most striking issues related to forced migration today is the amount of internal
displacement. At the end of 2010, UNHCR had 33.9 million persons under its protection
mandate, of which only 10.55 million (approximately 31%) were Convention refugees. 282 The
largest population that UNHCR offers protection to is Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs),
amounting to 14.7 million persons (approximately 43%). 283 A refugee, as discussed previously,
must be outside the territory of their home state, an element which IDPs lack. In the view of
UNHCR, IDPs have undergone similar experiences as Convention refugees, the only difference
being that they have not crossed an international border and thus are not considered a refugee in
the legal sense. 284 An IDP is not just any person displaced within their home country. There are
specific parameters for this status, similar to gaining refugee status. Although only 14.7 million
IDPs receive attention from UNHCR, they estimate that there are approximately 27 million IDPs
around the world. 285
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Unlike refugees, there is no legal definition for IDPs. 286 The general definition in the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement includes:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. 287

The inclusion of IDPs under the mandate of the UNHCR is an insight into the weaknesses and
limitations of the 1951 Convention: that many people made vulnerable through forced
displacement do not fall under its definition. IDPs are included in the protection scheme of
UNHCR and other organizations, which construct camps and distribute aid to the best of their
ability and available resources. However, there is no clear and stable internationally-mandated
legal responsibility or protection regime for IDPs as they have not crossed an international
border. 288 They fall under the legal responsibility of their home state. Thus, to some extent,
providing internal protection for those suffering as a result of war and conflict prevents them
from seeking legally secure, stable, long-term asylum outside their home country as is their legal
right.
Prior to the adoption of the 1951 Convention, there was no agreement that a refugee
necessarily had to be outside their country of origin. 289 However, as the Convention was written
during the emergence of the Cold War, this necessity for border crossing makes sense, as the
“crossing of the ‘Iron Curtain’ was considered to be of critical importance” and it was unlikely
that the communist control in the Soviet Union was to produce internal displacement.290
Although this division is no longer present, many authorities in the field of refugee studies
believe that alienage is paramount to providing persons with international protection, 291 and with
the current legal framework of international refugee law, this is true. As it stands, those who are
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in similar circumstances to refugees, but have not crossed an international border have had their
bond and relationship with the state severed, but have no new sovereign to depend on. Refugee
law is premised on the idea of host states/states of asylum providing surrogate state protection
where the state of nationality has failed. 292 However, in the case of IDPs, their basic rights
remain dependent on the ability and resources of UNHCR or some other humanitarian
organization.
The New Context of Displacement
The dominant discourses of our era privilege globalization and human rights, operate
under the assumption that democratic rule is the norm. Regardless of the reality, most states
claim to be democratic or at least moving towards democratization. As democracy and human
rights have become the global norm, 293 the ideological battle of the Cold War that gave refugee
status its political charge and significance is no longer present. In this ‘new world order’ the
West is now the global north, and the ‘enemy’ is no longer as easily defined, making refugees
less politically and ideologically significant.294 Refugees are no longer being produced by
“defunct and defeated regimes,” 295 but come from sovereign and sometimes democratic
nations. 296
The ‘New World Order’
The ‘political refugee’ was the dominant character in forced migration for much of the
twentieth century, constructed through an important global political and social paradigm for
much of that century. 297 Today the ‘humanitarian refugee’ fleeing the destitute global south has
replaced the political refugee.
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With the end of the Cold War the world embarked on a “new world order”, in which the
world was no longer divided by ideology, and was united by law and democracy. 298 The intrinsic
ideas of this new era were expressed by then President George HW Bush in his speech to
Congress on March 7, 1991:299
Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided, a world of barbed wire and concrete
block, conflict and cold war. And now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in
which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a
"world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the
strong." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the
historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a
home among all nations.

The reality is that this new world order has ushered in a new global divide, not between the West
and the East, but the north and south. Rather than a geographical separation, this is a social
divide 300 and an expression of the current state of global inequality. 301 Since many of the
countries of the global south became independent sovereign states, predominantly through the
process of decolonization, they have not reached the prosperity of the global north, as many
regions of the global south are plagued by the legacy of slavery, colonization, economic
exploitation and underdevelopment, internal conflict, and generally a lower realization of basic
human rights.
These inequalities are exacerbated by the process of globalization, which is the postcommunist era’s universal ideology of progress. 302 In an economic context, globalization is often
used analogously with free trade, referring to “the reduction and removal of barriers between
national borders in order to facilitate the flow of goods, capital, services and labor,” 303 which
allows for countries to reduce costs of imports and bring more goods into the domestic economy.
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However, as international law and organizations have moved towards regimes for free movement
of goods, capital, and services, 304 there is no such regime for the free movement of labor. In fact,
migration has become more restrictive than in the past, as witnessed in the phenomenon of
‘fortress Europe,’ as mentioned in Part II.305
Globalization, however, is not a neutral process and does not affect all equally: “some
may prosper and others will be left behind…those who sit at the top of social and economic
hierarchies, both countries and individuals, are more likely to see gains from globalization.” 306
The reality is that the countries that constitute the global south entered at the bottom of the social
and economic hierarchies, and have struggled to move out of this position, resulting in uneven
progress and an increased divide between the global north and south.
New players in displacement
The increasing amount of forced migration has not happened in a vacuum. There are
other socio-economic conditions that create the ‘root causes’ of displacement. These conditions
provide the impetus to move or conditions in which forced displacement is probable. As the
world is on the path to globalization, the global south has not been left out. International
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB),
have had an increasing role in shaping the development trajectory of the global south. The IMF
and WB are charged with the mission to reduce poverty and increase development through
advising on economic policies and international investment, and generally overseeing the
international economy. 307
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The IMF and WB are “rhetorically committed” to the achievement of democratization
and human rights in the state’s that they operate in, but their involvement in many of the state’s
key affairs violate the achievement of these goals. In order to receive funds from these financial
institutions, states must comply with certain conditions. These institutions often decide on state
budgets, the value (and devaluation) of national currency, and the price of food and energy. 308 In
addition to denying democratic participation on issues that deeply effect the local economy, 309
many of the structural adjustment loans have conditions requiring “the cutting of public
expenditure on health and education, labor market deregulation, export-oriented production, and
privatization, [which] have led to increased income disparity, human rights abuses, and
marginalization of the poor and rural populations in many countries.” 310 Here we can see that the
power lies in the desires of the northern-backed international institutions, not the needs and
realities of the state.
According to Chossudovsky,
The restructuring of the world economy under the guidance of the Washington-based
international financial institutions increasingly denies individual developing countries the
possibility of building a national economy: the internationalization of macro- economic policy
transforms countries into open territories and national economies into 'reserves' of cheap labor
and natural resources [for the benefit of the global north]. 311

In reality, these policies do not work towards ending poverty, put rather towards a “globalization
of poverty.” 312 These institutions are often portrayed as the leader of global economic
liberalization, however in reality they are responsible for exacerbating existing conditions of
poverty and conflict. The policies implemented also prevent governments from effectively
honoring commitments to social welfare and as well as preventing a relationship of social
responsibility through democracy between the state and citizens. These policies can have direct
impact on further widening the divide between the global north and south and in creating
environments in which migration is to likely result.
International financial institutions, in cooperation with international corporations, have
also influenced policy and advised funds for development projects that cause massive amounts of
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displacement. These projects are varied, and include dams, urban development, mining and
mineral extraction, mega-events, and agri-business. There are no concrete numbers on many
persons have been displaced by development projects. However, many experts estimate that in
the past twenty years over 250 million people have been displaced in the name of
development, 313 reaching some 15 million people annually, 314 a number much larger than those
fleeing war and conflict.
These “forced resettlers,” as Turton calls them, are persons displaced in the name of the
“national interest” to make way for a development project and have no option of ever returning
‘home.’ 315 The persons displaced in these projects are typically amongst the “poorest and
politically most marginal members of a society” (subsistence farmers, indigenous groups, etc.)
and are likely to become more vulnerable and fall further into poverty as a result of
displacement.316 These persons are an example of victims of displacement that have no formal
protection regime as they fall outside of the limited scope of international refugee law, and
although internally displaced, they are not considered IDPs. Victims of development-induced
displacement are potentially more vulnerable than IDPs, as there are limited organizations
dedicated specifically to assisting those affected by these projects, and have few avenues for
legal recourse. 317
The most recent trend in foreign development projects is agricultural investment, or ‘land
grabs.’ 318 The Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that from 2007 to 2010, foreign
investors acquired 20 million hectares of land in Africa alone, many times with leases of up to 99
years; 319 the conditions of these investment deals are often facilitated by the World Bank
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policies. 320 Many of these investments, and other similar projects, come with promises of local
development, however these promise are rarely fulfilled. A report issued in September 2010 by
the World Bank states that:
Many investments…failed to live up to expectations and, instead of generating sustainable
benefits, contributed to asset loss and left local people worse off than they would have been
without the investment. In fact, even though an effort was made to cover a wide spectrum of
situations, case studies confirm that in many cases benefits were lower than anticipated or did not
materialize at all. 321

This statement shows that these projects that are directly facilitated by international financial
institutions are further exacerbating socio-economic issues in countries of the global south, and
creating conditions of internal displacement and the potential to create conditions that have
potential to create conflict. 322
The mission to spread these values associated with globalization, namely democracy and
neo-liberal economics has a similar connection to colonialism. Historically, the discourse of
democracy was used to “announce, argue, and promote the cultural superiority of colonizing
states” to justify their actions, 323 and also access foreign resources. In fact, the process of
globalization, led by neo-liberal economics, has continued to reinforce a historical global power
dynamic 324 and threatens to “recolonize” the global south. 325
Human Rights and Humanitarianism
As the world has become more connected through globalization, so have the
responsibilities for the causes of forced migration and displacement, as discussed above.
However, the global north has effectively been able to refrain from taking responsibility for
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displacement. The myth of difference discussed in Part II, has constructed the idea that the
contemporary refugee flows in the global south are distinctly different from those of the past.326
This idea of this difference effectively consigns the blame of refugee production to the
governments and societies of the global south. This is done through the use of human rights and
humanitarianism, which not only removes the blame from the global north, but also maintains
the current power dynamic between the global north and south.
Refugees and the Human Rights Discourse
As discussed in Part II, when forced displacement occurs between states in the global
south “we are prepared to assume that they are refugees, or even that they should be considered
as such despite not fitting within the letter of the law.”
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Essentially, as long as they remain

within the global south, northern states are not reluctant to acknowledge either their refugeehood
or, in the case of IDPs, their inclusion under UNHCR’s mandate. The international refugee
regime has become intertwined with the discourses of human rights and humanitarianism. One
could even argue that the international refugee regime has become part of the larger international
human rights law regime that functions to prevent, monitor and deter abuses. In this sense, the
international refugee law regime provides surrogate protection for some human rights, if victims
of abuse are able to cross international borders and seek protection 328 However, the discourse of
human rights, while it has benefits, also has inherently problematic aspects.
Some believe that merging international refugee law with human rights law is the logical
step towards a greater realization of human rights for displaced persons. 329 There is a connection
between refugee law and human rights law, as the right to asylum was first codified in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 330 However, rights are difficult to claim because
refugees fall outside of the normative nation-state framework in which there is territory,
government, citizens and non-citizens. The refugee does not fit in this framework, as they are
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located within the “strange territory of estrangement” between a citizen and a foreigner. 331 In
other words, an in-between space in which one is not quite ‘human,’ in the sense that they are not
entitled to rights and agency, or to have their actions and opinions hold significance. 332
In some lines of thought, the 1951 Convention can be seen as an attempt to place the
refugee, as a person who falls outside of the normative understanding of the state, back into the
state system, to restore the individual as political subject and allowing them to access their “right
to have rights.” As Arendt expresses “[w]e became aware of the existence of a right to have
rights… and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of
people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global
political situation.” 333 Although Arendt wrote under the context of World War II and the Cold
War, this statement is still relevant. In a way, the refugee’s subjectivity is overshadowed by the
citizen-state relationship that is essential to the current system of sovereign states; as non-citizens
there is no direct accountability to any power to uphold their rights. This issue is particularly
evident in the global north, where the increasing use of temporary protection further limits the
displaced person’s access to rights, as discussed in Part II.
The discourse of human rights is seductive as the language of human rights offers an
ostensibly apolitical cure all for countries in the global south, a “mantra” that the north promotes
in displacement-inducing and post-conflict societies. 334 Human rights hold promises of
empowerment, 335 and “give marginalized populations a universal language in which to present
their particular demands as something more than subjectively felt grievances . . . a technique of
articulation to which the rest of the world is bound, in principle, to listen.”
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Although human

rights have the potential to offer this empowerment, it often fails to attend to the root causes of
the displacement, as discussed above. When claims to human rights are made, “the systemic

331

Michael Dillon, “The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the “Inter” of International Relations
and Continental Thought,” in Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,eds. by David Campbell and
Michael J. Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 101.
332
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 1967), 296.
333
Ibid., 297
334
B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law,” 17.
335
Brown, “The Most We Can Hope For...: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism,” The South Atlantic
Quarterly, 103, no. 2/3 (Spring/Summer 2004): 455.
336
Beckett, “Rebel Without a Cause? Martti Koskenniemi and the Critical Legal Project,” German Law
Journal 7, no. 12 (2006): 1063.

60

context of abuses and vulnerabilities is largely removed from view” as human rights are often
documented, but not explained. 337
This lack of explanation is dangerous because without making an effort to understand the
root causes of the problem, human rights really can only be a forum for grievances rather than an
effort towards structural change. Thus, Douzinas states that “[i]t follows that as human rights
become the lingua franca of the New Times but are unable to eliminate conflict, the formal
struggle over human rights will revolve predominantly around their interpretation and
application. As always, the universal is placed at the service of the particular: it is the prerogative
of a particular to announce the universal.” 338 The human rights discourse, while incredibly
powerful in that most states are signatory to many of the conventions and laws, fail to have much
influence on real change. In other words, the language of human rights have allowed the global
north to remain largely un-attached from the root causes of refugee production, but as the
abovementioned section suggested, this is not the reality.
Humanitarianism
The international refugee regime operates differently in the global north and in the global
south. As discussed in Part II asylum procedures in the global north have merged with
immigration, creating serious protection concerns. However, the reality is that most refugees and
asylum seekers do not reach the territory of the global north, and this is not likely to change.
Many authors advocate for expanding the definition of a refugee to be similar to the regional
definitions utilized in Africa and Latin America in order to accommodate those fleeing
generalized violence and civil strife. 339 Although this would potentially be a positive step in
protection, it is unlikely that the states of the global north will approve such a change, as they
will not agree to an increase in the number of asylum claims they must accept.
Even if the definition is expanded to include more persons and diverse forms of
displacement, through the language of human rights or other inclusions, it does not touch at
remedying the root causes of displacement or deal with the core issues of international refugee
law. As international refugee law developed in a period where there was no accountability
between the West and the existing (and defeated) totalitarian regimes, and thus “refugee law is
337
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not aimed at holding [refugee producing] states responsible, but rather its purpose is
remedial.” 340 The claim can be made that this is where human rights law’s role is important, as
states are signatory to many conventions and treaties which in theory protect their citizens from
the need to flee their state. However, the reality on the ground is that it is difficult to hold states
accountable to these principles, as human rights and sovereignty are often clashing concepts. 341
Thus refugee law is aimed at ‘helping,’ not fixing the problem, and is increasingly being pushed
to work exclusively under the banner of humanitarianism.
‘Humanitarian’ is defined generally as “concerned with or seeking to promote human
welfare.” 342 The guidelines for humanitarian action that are most referenced are the seven
fundamental principles created by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) 343 in
1965: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and
universality. 344 The ideals associated with humanitarianism and politics are usually
conceptualized as clashing, so traditionally they have been kept as separate. 345 In the battle to
keep these ideas separate, the principles of impartiality and neutrality seem to recurrently
become an issue. Generally speaking, this issue has created two camps of thought regarding
humanitarianism: the ‘classicists,’ who are most aligned with the principles of the ICRC, which
believe that humanitarian work can and should be completely separated from politics, and
‘political humanitarians’ who believe that humanitarianism cannot and should not be separated
from politics. 346
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According to Chimni, who aligns with the ‘political humanitarians,’ the word
‘humanitarianism’ is “omnifarious and lacks conceptual boundaries” as the term has not been
defined explicitly in international law, and thus a wide range of acts are often considered or
claimed to be ‘humanitarian.’ The ‘ideology’ 347 of humanitarianism is that “the human has the
same needs, desires and traits everywhere and these (ought to) determine the rights we have.” 348
To be impartial and neutral (and thus humanitarian) implies “helping and protecting victims
irrespective of who and where they are and why they are in need.” 349
Refugee protection is, in theory, premised on humanitarian principles, as the ‘problem’ of
refugees is seen to be a humanitarian issue. The preamble to the 1951 Convention states that the
Convention signifies that by signing this document, states are “recognizing the social and
humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent
this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States,” 350 and the Statute of UNHCR
states that “the work of the [UNHCR] is humanitarian and social and of an entirely non-political
character.” 351 In theory, then, international refugee law is founded on the principles of
humanitarianism, not politics. Yet law is created and implemented by states that remain
entrenched in politics. This “ideology of humanitarianism” is something that, according to
Chimni, belongs to hegemonic states (or states in the global north), which “mobilizes a range of
meanings and practices to establish and sustain global relations of domination,” an ideology that
is also “facilitating the erosion of the fundamental principles of refugee protection.” 352
Humanitarianism has had a place in international politics largely since the creation of the
ICRC in 1863, but today it holds a greater salience than in the past.353 Today humanitarianism is
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the ‘”left hand of the empire [or global north]” 354 and “overlaps with and contributes to the end
of politics, instantiated by the unchallenged rule of world police and the rescue of ‘’victims.’” 355
What is problematic with contemporary humanitarianism is that it seems to seek the protection
of, or work towards, the realization of human rights, but it does so artificially and without
attention to what we might call the “root causes” of human rights concerns. This is evidenced in
the case of Rwanda, where Chossudovsky articulates this disconnect, which also links to the
aforementioned issues associated with globalization and international financial institutions:
The Rwandan crisis has been presented by the western media as a profuse narrative of human
suffering, while carefully neglecting to explain the underlying social and economic causes. The
brutality of the massacres have shocked the world community, but what the international press
failed to mention is that the civil war was preceded by the flare-up of a deep-seated economic
crisis. It was the restructuring of the agricultural system which precipitated the population into
abject poverty and destitution. 356

As Douzinas explains, “post-communist humanitarianism, scared by the atrocities of 20th
century ideology, prefers a suffering humanity and replaces the grand narratives of history with
the misfortune of the species.” 357 In the above example from Rwanda, we can see that the
‘humanitarian’ and ‘human rights’ discourses effectively placed blame in the structures of the
state and region, not in the larger global dynamics.
International refugee law consists of a large body of legally binding norms and principles,
which are aimed at promoting asylum in foreign countries, and while others such as IDPs may
receive protection, it is often more about humanitarian intervention in struggling countries than
legal protections. 358 However, refugee protection is moving more towards humanitarianism,
rather than focus on legal rights, as most forced displacement is contained in the global south.
The refugee label, in both the global north and south, implies humanitarianism and
“creates and imposes an institutional dependency,” 359 relating humanitarianism to a sort of
victimization. Humanitarianism, as an ideology used by the hegemonic north effectively creates
a victimized and suffering Other, which manifests as those from the global south. The victim is
354
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someone without agency, “whose dignity and worth have been violated, … powerless, helpless
and innocent, [the victim’s] basic nature and needs have been denied” and that they are often
conceptualized as “part of an indistinct mass or horde of disparaging, dispirited people,” 360 and
as victims of some evil, or perhaps human rights violations, in a sense they lose their
humanity, 361 what Giorgio Agamben refers to as “bare life.” 362
In our globalized world, everything has been put into terms of exporting and importing,
and cost and benefit. The global north not only exports financial and economic ideas into the
global south, as mentioned above, but it also exports democracy and human rights. 363 In this line
of thought, humanitarianism lies in a paradigm of the victim/ perpetrator/moral savior- a
paradigm in which the countries of the north have delegated themselves as the moral savior and
teacher, and the ‘Other’ as the victim and perpetrator.364 This stance effectively allows powerful
(wealthy, democratic, and ‘rights-bearing’) societies to place the blame on other societies (in the
global south) as the cause of human rights violations, without taking responsibility for their role
in the creation of situations in which rights are not guaranteed or realized. According to
Douzinas, “we [the global north] do not like these others [the suffering of the global south], but
we love pitying them. They, the savages/victims, make us civilized.” 365 In this humanitarianism,
refugees are often cast as the hopeless victim, resulting in a power dynamic in which the global
north provides humanitarian aid, “conceived of in terms of charity rather than as a means of
enabling refugees to enjoy their rights.” 366 This system, according to Chimni is part of the larger
process of globalization, as it seeks “to legitimize and sustain an international system that
tolerates an unbelievable divide not only between the north and the south but also inside
them.” 367
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However, perhaps it is necessary to maintain a victim-like definition in order for the
concept of a ‘refugee’ to survive. 368 Would the north feel obligated to donate or assist if refugees
or other victims of displacement had agency, if they were not portrayed as passive recipients of
aid? Many refugees and forced migrants have been deeply affected by the process of
globalization, one that creates a global divide that is increasingly more difficult to bridge.
An Irrational Construction
The previous analysis and information provided argues that international refuge law has
lost its relevance as a protection mechanism in the contemporary realities of migration.
Furthermore, the category of the ‘refugee’ has become an irrational distinction in international
law. The continued use of the 1951 Convention has created and legitimated a normative
understanding of the ‘refugee,’ including the causes of forced displacement worthy of this title
and the associated international protection. This framework holds political persecution as the
form of oppression that deserves protection and international response. The attention of the
international community on the political refugee, or the Convention Refugee, has legitimated a
system in which structural violence in the global south is largely tolerated.
The domestic refugee systems in the countries of the global north have created a system
in which this irrational distinction is to their advantage, allowing them to legally restrict entry of
persons who do meet the Convention criteria. Derrida’s conception of ‘hospitality’ 369 takes an
interesting view in re-conceptualizing the restrictive policies towards refugees in the global
north. For Derrida, the way in which states and societies accept foreigners (or ‘guests’) into their
territory is framed around the notion of hospitality. The idea of ‘unconditional hospitality’ is
being “open to someone who is neither expected not invited, to whomever arrives as an
absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short wholly
other.” 370 The north is not unconditionally hospitable. They practice what Derrida terms
‘tolerance,’ which is “scrutinized hospitality, always under surveillance… and protecting of its
sovereignty.” 371 Tolerance implies that one is allowing entrance under the host’s terms.
368
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When dealing with issues of displacement, this attitude of ‘tolerance’ is problematic as it
is a conditional hospitality, or a hospitality without risk, in which he asks, can “a hospitality
protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality?” 372 One could
argue that the right to asylum 373 is the legal equivalent of such tolerance, 374 a preventative
measure to mitigate risk, and control and formalize the unexpected; the refugee or forced migrant
represents the limits of hospitality.
If we first accept that refugees are “an inevitable if unintended consequence of the
international states system,” 375 as citizens can no longer depend on their state for protection, one
can see the irrationality of the refugee system, as it attempts to control what is in fact
unexpected. However, as the causes of refugee production move away from clear individual
persecution at the hands of the state, this framework for regulation becomes more problematic.
Even this limited form of hospitality is waning as states in the north attempt to ensure that most
asylum seekers do not reach this territory. Hospitality and tolerance become increasingly
irrelevant as most forced migrants become contained under regional protection schemes in the
global south.
The consistent flows of forced migration that occur in the global south means that many
of the receiving countries do not have much choice in regulating their ‘hospitality.’ And as
forced displacement is dominated by internal displacement, how can a country practice this
discretionary power over its own citizens? Or in other words, how do we conceptualize this
relationship of tolerance, as the displaced become ‘guests’ in their own home? 376 In the global
south, tolerance has been replaced by humanitarianism. As discussed above, this humanitarian
refugee regime as it stands today reinforces global discrimination. The answer to fighting this
discrimination cannot be victimization. 377 By victimizing forced migrants we are removing their
political agency, not empowering them, and have moved towards a new form of imperialism or
totalitarianism. In the humanitarian world, it is the global north that has “the power of life [to
[allow to] live or survive) and the power of death (to let die) over the individual it considers the
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absolute victim.” 378 To move away from the humanitarian approach would be a move towards
relinquishing global control in all matters, including economic control and influence; a move that
is not likely to happen.
Then do we change the law? And if the legal definition of a refugee is made broader and
more persons are included under this legal category, what would this change? If the definition
were to be opened to meet the needs of all persons who are forced to migrate, in theory, whole
countries could cross borders and become refugees. Broadening the definition does not remedy
the root causes of forced migration, but rather creates a larger legal space to deal with them. The
current state of protracted refugee and IDP situations 379 is evidence that the expanded
understanding of forced migration in the global south and the inclusion of more persons but has
not changed the reality: people are fleeing and unable to return home.
For the millions of persons who are in these situations, 380 being a refugee, or a ward to
the humanitarian global north, has become a way of life. Protracted refugee situations are not
new, however they are becoming increasingly prevalent in part because of the prevalent
situations of war and conflict which have made return difficult, but also the international
community’s failure to bring them to an end. 381
So what can be done to better this protection in a rational, reasonable way? A purely legal
(often restrictive) approach, as is taken in much of the global north (discussed in Part II),
removes the issues of morals and ethics, and protection becomes a purely “legal transaction” as
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states will do only what the law requires. 382 On the other hand, a human rights-based or
humanitarian approach, which is the main approach to problems in the global south, tends to
remove the agency and autonomy of the individual. 383 Finding a balance between the two is
difficult. As stated before, human rights and state sovereignty tend to clash, as issues of
emigration can be framed in terms of human rights, whereas the issue of immigration always
remains a question of national sovereignty. 384 As the countries of emigration are predominantly
located in the global south, a certain distinction is created: issues of human rights abuse lie in the
south, while preserving sovereignty is the privilege of the north.
Since the end of Cold War, and the end of the era of the ‘political refugee’ (or
ideologically significant refugee), there has been an increasing effort to expand the
conceptualization of this phenomenon, moving from focus on the ‘refugee’ to forced migration
more generally. Some, most notably Hathaway, believe that refugee law is worth saving. For
him, the “challenge is not to rewrite refugee law, but rather to take advantage of the flexibility
which the extant body of law affords to retool it at an operation level” 385 and that refugee law
must remain its focus on refugees as it plays a “truly unique human rights role at a time when no
meaningful alternative is in sight.” 386 To an extent this is true. At this point there are no
alternatives in sight that acknowledge social realities, however, it is important that we realize that
the law cannot be the sole mediator for this realization. 387 Even if the field of ‘refugees’ is
expanded to forced migration, we are simply bringing more persons, into the sphere of
humanitarian protection, and further the conditions that allow forced migration to feed into the
larger context of northern dominance. 388
At this point, there are no meaningful alternatives in sight, because we are not actively
seeking them from outside the confines of the 1951 Convention. Most of the current critiques try
to re-conceptualize laws and policies with an emphasis on human rights or an increased space of
protection. Additionally, the current political climate and the immigration stance of many of the
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countries in the global north, who also fund most of UNHCR’s activities and programs, will not
agree to a more inclusive legal framework.389 What is needed is a not a re-conception of the law,
but rather a reform in how this space of protection is approached. The most realistic and relevant
approach to reform, is the ‘Dialogic Model’ proposed by Chimni, as discussed in Part II. This
model creates space for communication and discussion is opened which involves not only the
governments and intuitions in the global south, but the refugees themselves. 390 Similar to
Chimni’s manifesto on Third World Approaches to International Law, this model confronts
global inequalities, including the colonial logic of the global north’s humanitarian ideology. 391
Through challenging the current unilateral manner of decision making by UNHCR and the
global north, and encouraging greater regional partnership among states of the global south, this
model represents a step forward towards bridging the gap between the north and south and opens
the potential for real progress to be made.
CONCLUSION
International refugee law, as it stands today, legitimates a norm that is not beneficial to
those suffering displacement and is not in tune with reality. Under this system asylum in both the
north and south is no longer a legal, surrogate state protection. Instead, the refugee label has been
draped in humanitarianism and victimization, which exacerbates the divide between the north
and south and reaffirms the current global power dynamic as demonstrated in the process of
globalization. However, this is not an issue restricted to refugee law, as the larger body of
international law “is playing a crucial role in helping legitimize and sustain the unequal
structures and processes that manifest themselves in the growing north-south divide.” 392
As discussed earlier, the refugee holds an uncomfortable place in the international
imaginary, as it does not fit into the normal framework of citizenship and states. This discomfort
has led many to become specialists or experts in this field, as well as the emergence of refugee
aid organizations, refugee lobby and advocacy groups, refugee lawyers, academic journals and
389
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university programs dedicated to refugee studies, further legitimizing and perpetuating this
irrational distinction as an exceptional form of forced migration. The international refugee law
regime’s lack of remedial action has continued to propagate a strategy that holds “prevention is
preferable to cure.” 393 Through expanding humanitarian protection in the global south, the
international community reaffirms the legitimacy of the law and ignores root cause of
displacement that largely falls outside the 1951 Convention.
The figure of the refugee helps shed light on some of the limits of international law,
human rights and humanitarianism. The problem does not lie in the narrow definition of the
refugee, but rather in the geopolitical structure of today’s world. If the inequalities and uneven
development between the global north and south remain unchecked and continue grow, so will
migration. In a recent news article titled ““Has the Refugee Convention Outlived Its
Usefulness?” international refuge law expert Guy Goodwin-Gill stated: “The pure refugee does
exist, but there are many others who face insecurity because of economic problems and
persecution.” 394 The political refugee defined in the 1951 Convention has indeed become largely
extinct, and the uncritical acceptance of the current distinction of the ‘refugee’ as the exceptional
forced migrant legitimates and perpetuates an unequal and irrational framework for protection.
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